Today With JB: July 2009

Thursday, July 30, 2009

This Week at Amtrak; July 31, 2009

This Week at Amtrak; July 31, 2009

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.
America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA
Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org

Volume 6, Number 26

Sunday, July 26, 2009

This Week at Amtrak; July 27, 2009

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from
United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.
America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA
Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org
　
Volume 6, Number 25

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) The irrepressible William Lindley of Scottsdale, Arizona, frequent contributor to This Week at Amtrak, has come up with some sage thoughts about train stations. Mr. Lindley, in the Arizona heat, occasionally rides his motorcycle, drives his car, and frequently uses the metropolitan Phoenix areas bus and light rail transit system in his travels around town. He would very much like to ride Amtrak trains to and from Phoenix for his domestic and world travels, but, alas, none exist. Read, think, and enjoy.

[Begin quote]

By William Lindley

Imagine putting a 10-story building in the middle of Los Angeles International Airport's runway. Ridiculous! you say. Yet, that's what Kansas City did with their Union Station – built a mid-rise building right smack in the middle of the train platform area, destroying its ability to be a train station. Saint Louis built a mall inside its Union Station, but at least most of that could be removed fairly easily (malls are always changing, anyway).
Are our historic train stations only to become museums (like Kansas City's) or should they have a rightful place in our transportation future?

Atlanta recently made what appears to be a bad decision that will prevent some mainline trains from conveniently entering its planned new downtown station, but at least the station will be downtown. Saint Paul, Minnesota likewise is moving forward with the renovation of its Union Depot, close to downtown – as light rail, and possibly a southward extension of the upcoming Northstar commuter trains get underway.

These cities understand, as in most real estate, station sites are about Location, Location, Location. That means walking distance to downtown; it means connections with commuter trains and streetcars and buses; it means a place where mainline trains can move in and out easily, and where rail services can be provided.

When the national argument for passenger rail was at its lowest point, Dallas shortchanged itself on the latter, by providing only three platforms – barely enough for Trinity Railway commuter trains and one or two intercity trains. San Antonio, in contrast, found new life for its main depot building as a food an entertainment complex called Historic Sunset Station at St. Paul Square, but, built a harmonious, functional, and pleasant new adjacent passenger and train servicing facility just a few feet away, using the original passenger platforms.

If the original station does not fit today's demands, it is appropriate to build a new building "around" an existing depot as at San Antonio. But, also have the fortitude to build an updated facility in a new location convenient to the city's modern activity centers. Some of our best historic stations and depots, often over a century old, are located in parts of cities and towns no longer desirable for 24-hour public use because of dangerous neighbors.

While it is highly desirable to keep these older structures and find new uses for them, it is equally important and more desirable to meet the needs of the traveling public by providing a station facility in a safe and secure location. The most beautiful or historic station can be meticulously restored, but if it’s in a bad part of town or lacks adequate parking or transit connections, the purpose of a proper, useful, and desirable gateway for rail passengers into a city or town is defeated.

An interesting point of discussion has been for former New York Central train station and tower in Buffalo, New York. The building has been empty since 1979 and is in a high state of disrepair. The sprawling station complex is located 2.5 miles from downtown Buffalo, and was designed to host an astonishing 3,200 passengers per hour. Debate and plans are raging in Buffalo as to how best preserve this architectural gem, perhaps through reincarnation as a high speed rail terminal.

In Detroit, a similarly magnificent structure is in even more dire condition; the old Michigan Central station and tower in another huge complex sits outside of the normal traffic flow of downtown Detroit. The local government in Detroit has decreed the building should be torn down it is in such bad condition, but supporters of this huge architectural marvel are looking to create a new life for the station either through rail-related purposes or as a convention center and casino, perhaps an international trade processing center (The station is near the Ambassador Bridge and gateway to Canada.), or as police headquarters for the City of Detroit.
When Michigan Central originally constructed the complex in 1913, it was built to last a lifetime, and Amtrak used the facility until 1988. At the time of its construction, it was the tallest railroad station in the world, with its massive tower atop the station, going up 18 floors and comprising 500,000 square feet of space, including the station areas. Located about two miles southwest of downtown Detroit, the station was always considered to be outside the loop of normal downtown traffic. The hope today is a revival of the station building will also bring a revival of the surrounding neighborhood.

In Jacksonville, Florida, the downtown Union Station is today the Prime F. Osborn III Convention Center, named in honor of the late CSX Transportation Chairman of the Board who took a personal interest in saving the historic Jacksonville Union Station, designed by New York Architect Kenneth Mackensie Murcheson. Murcheson also designed Pennsylvania Station in Baltimore, Maryland, which is still in use today by Amtrak on the Northeast Corridor.
When Jacksonville Union Station opened at midnight on November 17, 1919, with its vast array of through-service and stub end tracks, it was designed to handle up to 210 trains a day. On opening day, the station handled more than 110 trains and 20,000 passengers. Every U.S. president from Woodrow Wilson through Richard Nixon traveled through the station. The station was mothballed in 1974, and Amtrak was moved to a far suburban station in the middle of one of Jacksonville’s industrial areas with a high crime rate.

While today’s primary use of the Union Station complex is a convention center, plans are also on the drawing board to remake the complex into a full multi-modal facility, which will include Amtrak, commuter rail, intercity bus, local transit, and downtown airport check-in facility where passengers will be able to come to the complex, check in for their airline, and then take secure bus service from the downtown station to the airport on the north end of Jacksonville. Ideally, when Amtrak moves back downtown, the present, far-suburban Amtrak station will stay in use as a second facility in a sprawling metropolitan area.

For all modern, full service stations, all the local connections – commuter trains, streetcars, buses, taxis, parking – create a "lesser matrix effect," where the intercity train matrix meets the local distribution matrix. The better these two systems tie together, the more useful they both become. Relieved of the necessity to carry every passengers everywhere, intercity trains can again rely, as they did in earlier days, on feeder regional and commuter trains. But, that does mean the Limited needs a stop at one or two suburban stations on either side of downtown, perhaps 10 to 30 miles out, at regional train stations (with that 10-to-30 mile spacing based on regional service levels), to collect and distribute passengers.

Let's look at one more example.

In Phoenix, the 1923 Union Station is still the junction point between BNSF and Union Pacific right downtown. The station is three short blocks from City Hall and a few more blocks away from the new City Hall light rail station (which Valley Metro Rail, in its wisdom, calls "First Avenue and Jefferson Street and Central Avenue and Washington Street Station" – not terribly easy to write and remember).

Phoenix Union Station maintains its alignments for the original six through tracks (a seventh was added during World War II) and several stub-ends on both sides of the depot. There is no other location close to downtown which could accommodate more than perhaps even two platforms, because of the street layout and the historic warehouse district.

Advanced studies are underway for both commuter rail in metro Phoenix and for express trains to Tucson (120 miles to the southeast). The Tucson trains would not be "high speed," but would likely travel at 79 MPH or 90 MPH on upgraded (double-and-triple-tracked) Union Pacific rails. UP, BNSF, and Arizona's short-line railroads are involved, and it is known the railroads are businesses and expect any passenger agreement to be beneficial to their freight business. Arizona has learned from California and New Mexico, Utah, and other western states which have succeeded in working relationships and actual operations with host freight railroads.
Valley Metro Rail ("METRO"), meanwhile, is planning a westward extension in the median of Interstate 10, taking LRVs potentially right past the railroad depot. There has been some talk also of historic or modern streetcars along Washington Street from downtown to the Capitol at 19th Avenue, should the LRT line be deferred or rerouted – and these streetcars could certainly connect Union Station to the Capitol with its thousands of daily workers at the west end, and the LRT line at the east end.

The city of Phoenix has certainly grown since the historic downtown station was built. In the 1920s, a civic goal was 100,000 citizens; today the city boasts 1.5 million, and the metro area over 4 million. But, as the population has expanded fifteen-fold, transportation options have expanded, too. Union Station was built to handle 90% of the transportation needs of a city of 100,000, so it certainly could handle 10% of transportation of a city ten times larger. It still fits the city.

And, it fits the city, too, in its Mission Revival architectural style. It is not enough for a station to be correctly located (both in the city and on the railroad mains) – a station also serves as a gateway, setting the mood for travelers entering a city or town. A station is part of a city's identity; and Phoenix Union Station does fit.

So, in Phoenix, at least for the upcoming decade, Union Station is the only logical intercity train station.

In the future, following Berlin, Germany's motif, a new modern station could be built west of the Airport LRT station (which METRO again calls "44th Street and Washington Street" instead of "Airport"). There is room enough between 38th Street and 44th Street to build an eight or 10 platform railroad station with connections to the new people-mover (to all airport terminals, parking garages, the car rental center, taxicabs and tour buses). This new station would handle commuter trains, intrastate express trains, intercity trains from Los Angeles, San Diego, the Grand Canyon, El Paso, Albuquerque, and points east.

Yet, even in that scenario, Union Station remains the only choice for a downtown depot. Perhaps the commuter trains and express trains will stop there, with the intercity trains serving the Airport station. Once regional commuter trains cover the intermediate stations, a modern Golden State intercity train would likely stop at suburban Gilbert on the east side and suburban Goodyear on the west, with those stations' regional rail connections. Arizona Express trains would likely serve Union Station, the Airport, Tempe (with Arizona State University's huge main campus), Mesa, and Gilbert and just a few more intermediate stops north of downtown Tucson.

A mix of trains and services then blankets southern Arizona. Union Station steps back at that point from some of its design role, and becomes more an historic gathering place, a meeting place, perhaps with conference facilities or shopping in addition to regional rail and streetcar connections.

Southern California has the newest and among the most robust examples of several overlaid systems, although there is room for improvement even there. Los Angeles Union Station has been well refitted to its modern role, a re-interpretation of its historic one; the same is true of San Diego's Santa Fe station. These serve as models for other cities; look, too, to Saint Paul. Learn from mistakes at Kansas City and near-misses like Dallas. Denver would be wise to consider the constraints at Dallas as it looks to reconfigure its historic station built in 1881 as part of a new development, even as it seeks to bring commuter and more intercity service back to the station.

Many of our historic train stations should continue their revival along with their passenger trains... past is prologue.

[End quote]

2) It’s contest time here at TWA! How many train stations can you name where a local or state government treasury has paid to rebuild, upgrade, or create a new station on behalf of Amtrak, and only perhaps months or very few years later Amtrak abandons or severely curtails service to that station?

Here’s a short sample to start your thinking process:

Tampa, Florida
Lakeland, Florida
Dade City, Florida
Ocala, Florida
Pensacola, Florida
Tallahassee, Florida
Chipley, Florida
Lake City, Florida
Madison, Florida
Atmore, Alabama
Bay St. Louis, Mississippi
Gulfport, Mississippi
Tempe, Arizona
Louisville, Kentucky

Okay, that should get you started. Send your list to TWA at info@unitedrail.org and we will publish a complete list along with the name of the winner. When you send the list, please include the name of the train which served the former station and, if possible, when the service was discontinued.

3) Just before all the commotion began about Amtrak’s grievously flawed Gulf Coast report restoring passenger train service east of New Orleans, news came from Wisconsin the state was purchasing two train sets, totaling 14 cars, from well-respected Talgo of Spain to place in service on a high speed route between Chicago and Wisconsin stations.

Those with a current copy of Amtrak’s Summer 2009 timetable will notice it is a Talgo train set speeding along Puget Sound en route to Olympia, Washington and Eugene, Oregon for Amtrak’s Cascades service in the Pacific Northwest.

Most people, including this writer, thought Talgo had been banished from expansion in the United States because of safety restrictions imposed by the Federal Railroad Administration. Talgo had received a waiver for those restrictions, but was only allowed to operate trains on approved trackage in the Pacific Northwest. Just a couple of weeks prior to the Wisconsin announcement, it was learned from insider sources the FRA had been studying a relaxation of its perhaps overly rigid standards for Talgo. That information proved to be true with the Wisconsin announcement.

As a bonus, Wisconsin convinced Talgo to perform final assembly of the Talgo equipment in the state, creating local jobs along with buying shiny new trains.

Some old time railroaders have lightly grumbled about mixing in too many types of equipment into Amtrak’s fleet, and the need for overall uniformity for ease and lower cost of maintenance. Certainly, a case can be made for that, but an equally compelling case can be made for the right type of equipment on each individual route.

Along those lines, there are a number of present Amtrak routes where the old Colorado Railcar/now US Railcar DMU self-propelled units are the perfect answer to lower operating costs and matching the right type of equipment to the right type of passenger demand and route.

4) Continuing with that subject, Amtrak has published an RFP for Viewliner 2 passenger cars. In part, here is what the RFP said:

[Begin quote]

PURCHASE OF "VIEWLINER 2" LONG-DISTANCE SINGLE-LEVEL PASSENGER CARS
RFP# X-047-9167-001

INTRODUCTION:

Amtrak intends to issue a competitive Request for Proposal for a vendor to design, manufacture and deliver 130 "Viewliner 2" Long Distance Single-Level Passenger Cars, with an option for Amtrak to purchase up to an additional 70 cars. The "Viewliner 2" rolling stock which is fully described in the Technical Specifications, will be used as Amtrak passenger trains, primarily in long-distance service, but capable of operating anywhere within Amtrak’s system. There are four (4) "Viewliner 2" car types: Diners, Sleepers, Baggage-Dorms and Baggage cars. The "Viewliner 2" cars will be modeled on the concept of the Amtrak "Viewliner 1" cars.

[End quote]

The RFP goes on to state ultimately the contract for purchase of these cars and the start of construction will be issued in May 2010, with a notice to proceed in June 2010.

So, with all due lack of speed, we’re a year away from anything even being brought to a point of construction.

Let’s break down the specific order.

– 130 cars total, with an option to purchase up to 70 additional cars, for a grand total of 200 cars, if every option is exercised.
– The 130 cars will be divided into four types: Diners, Sleepers, Baggage-Crew Dorms, and Baggage Cars.
Even if you divide 130 relatively evenly, you still come up with only 32 or 33 cars per type of car. That will not double the existing 50 car Viewliner 1 sleeping car fleet, which is so worn out it can only charitably be described as a long line of rolling slums.

Amtrak’s single level dining car fleet is exclusively made up of Heritage fleet diners, which have operated far beyond their initial service life expectancy. At present, Amtrak doesn’t operate any crew dormitory cars, but instead wastes sleeping car revenue space with crew billets (Granted, you have to put the crews somewhere, but a better solution would have been to keep the older Heritage crew dorms running than taking up high-dollar revenue sleeping car space.).

Baggage cars are all Heritage fleet cars, and there is always a need for more baggage cars.

So, even adding the additional 70 cars for the optional order, once again, Amtrak is doing nothing more than replacing fleet instead of adding to its fleet – inadequately so.

This may be news to Amtrak’s financial folks and senior executives, but, why is Amtrak always buying equipment? It’s very rare among common carriers – especially airlines – to actually buy passenger equipment. Amtrak already knows how to lease locomotives, why can’t it lease passenger cars, too? What is the purpose of getting free federal monies from Congress to buy, when private capital can be used to lease? Is this another example of Amtrak’s lack of financial sophistication? Is it just easier to beg money from Congress every year instead of doing something proactive in the leasing market?

5) Look at some of Amtrak’s internal numbers. Amtrak reports revenue several different ways (not different revenue, but revenue as it relates in different ways). One of the ways it reports revenue is "revenue per car day." This measures coach revenue versus sleeping car revenue, and it’s done by route. The numbers are based on average days.

This particular set of figures is based on 12 months prior to and including November of 2008; this is NOT a fiscal year report.

Route and classes of revenues

Empire Builder
Superliner Coach – $5,163
Superliner Sleeper – $5,015

City of New Orleans
Superliner Coach – $4,624
Superliner Sleeper – $3,253

Southwest Chief
Superliner Coach – $4,419
Superliner Sleeper – $4,467

Auto Train (Northbound, Train No. 52) *
Superliner Coach – $4,339
Superliner Sleeper – $5,286

Auto Train (Southbound, Train No. 53) *
Superliner Coach – $4,255
Superliner Sleeper – $5,583

California Zephyr
Superliner Coach – $3,251
Superliner Sleeper – $3,587

Coast Starlight **
Superliner Coach – $3,134
Superliner Sleeper – $2,818

Capitol Limited
Superliner Coach – $3,048
Superliner Sleeper – $3,243

Texas Eagle
Superliner Coach – $2,238
Superliner Sleeper – $2,603

Sunset Limited
Superliner Coach – $1,972
Superliner Sleeper – $2,545

12 Month Average
Superliner Coach – $3,476
Superliner Sleeper – $3,835

* Auto Train is reported as two separate figures, north and south.
** Coast Starlight figures include long periods of the train not operating due to the mudslides included in this period, and when the train did operate for some of the period, it only operated on part of the route and without sleeping cars.

What do we learn from these figures? On average, sleeping cars generate more revenue than coaches. What do we conclude from these figures? Sleeping car and first class travel are an important part of the future growth of Amtrak and should have equal – if not greater – weight than coach travel when planning for the future and compiling new car orders.

The most important fact to remember when looking at how well the sleeping car business does for Amtrak long distance trains is that sleeping cars are an even greater secret to Amtrak passengers than Amtrak is itself to the traveling public.

Everything Amtrak does overall is aimed at the coach passenger. When calling an Amtrak reservations center, an assumption is automatically made by res agents passengers only want coach, and in most cases, sleeping car accommodations are never mentioned as an option. When booking through Amtrak’s Internet portal, coach tickets are offered first, and sleeping car accommodations are offered only to hawk-eyed ticket buyers as an afterthought.

In reality, just like Amtrak continually ignores long distance trains in its future plans, it even more ignores sleeping car passengers.

6) This always filters back to the same question: Where is Amtrak’s vision for the future? Where is Amtrak’s long term plan? Where will Amtrak be five, 10, or 20 years from now? Based on what we’ve heard so far, probably exactly the same place it is today, constantly begging for money from a government treasury, and ignoring the most lucrative parts of its business.

7) Comments continue to come into TWA about the grossly flawed P.R.I.I.A. Section 226 Gulf Coast Service Plan Report.

A number of people have asked about simply restoring the route of the Floridian between Chicago and Florida, which was discontinued in 1979 during the Carter administration. The quick answer is some of that railroad infrastructure is gone, and other parts of that route have been severely downgraded to "creeping along" track speeds. Many will remember the short-lived Kentucky Cardinal, which operated between Chicago and Louisville, Kentucky. The biggest part of the problem of that route was slow track; the train crept along at speeds not much faster than speed walking.

While a restoration of the Floridian – or any Chicago to Florida route, especially one via Atlanta – is desirable, from an economic standpoint and the ability to quickly restored Chicago to Florida service, the cheapest and best bet is to either extend the City of New Orleans from New Orleans to Florida, or the Capitol Limited from Washington, D.C. to Florida. Restoring the Floridian route or a similar route would require an entire new set of station infrastructure, upgrading hundreds of miles of railroad to acceptable passenger speeds, and have a need for a number of new sidings or double tracking of very congested railroads. Simply extending the City of New Orleans or Capitol Limited would require no new stations, and only additional train sets, not completely new fleets of equipment.

Depending on originating terminal departure times, either the City of New Orleans or the Capitol Limited could make it to Florida by traveling one night, but it would be two very long days on either side of that one night’s travel. By extending existing schedules, two nights of travel are required, but, based on the success of multi-night schedules in the west, this is not an insurmountable problem.

Here are comments from several TWA readers.

[Begin quote]

I look forward to receiving each issue of This Week at Amtrak and appreciate URPA's consistent support for the restoration of rail service east of New Orleans. I am especially pleased to see I am not alone in my analysis of Amtrak's prejudged, fraudulent report concerning the restoration of this missing link in the national rail passenger system.

Back when the Sunset Limited ran through to Florida I was a frequent rider and spent many hours observing Sunset operations and speaking to station agents and train crews. When timekeeping became a major problem for eastbound train No. 2, the station agents and on board crews whom I had come to know collectively came to the conclusion the traveling public would be better served by an extension of the City of New Orleans to Florida. This would reestablish through service between Chicago and Florida and would maintain westbound service to California via a connection at New Orleans. Eastbound passengers from California would likely be required to make an overnight layover in New Orleans before heading to Florida, however, this would be no worse than the present routing via Chicago and Washington in terms of travel time. The net gain would be the ability to operate a timely service with great savings to Amtrak which often had to bus passengers east of New Orleans and/or provide overnight lodging in Jacksonville due to late operations and/or missed connections.

Amazingly, Amtrak never thought of this option on their own despite often having to annul two out of three trips per week of train No. 2 in New Orleans due to excessive lateness. This also necessitated the cancellation the following trip of westbound No. 1. After paying massive amounts of money for the recently released report, Amtrak points out the Chicago option would be the most effective, yet, thanks to fraudulent expenses, this (and all options) appears to be extremely costly.

The report lists expenses for station improvements along the route despite the fact the facilities across North Florida are basically in the same condition as when Amtrak abruptly left the scene after Hurricane Katrina, a move straight out of the playbook of Baltimore Colts owner Robert Irsay who snuck out of town in the dead of the night and moved his team to Indianapolis.

The full service stations in Pensacola and Tallahassee were constructed and/or improved with ADA compliance in mind. Platforms were constructed with the appropriate safety features that had just come into use elsewhere in that day and time. The Tallahassee station, which was actually a remodeled freight station, had ADA compliant ramps added to allow easy access to the off grade waiting room/ticket office. Since Amtrak's pullout, a local group of film buffs has used the waiting room periodically to show movies. The organizer of this group tells me people in wheelchairs often attend. I challenge Amtrak to explain to me why massive amounts of money are needed to rebuild the platform and make other ADA improvements at that station. Likewise, what changes are needed in Pensacola since the station is basically a grade level facility?

There are numerous other inaccuracies in the report such as the time required to train crews and the absurd allocation of money for a new Sanford station. These have been well documented in your newsletter, hence, I will reserve comment.

Thanks again for your leadership in exposing this report. Hopefully, Amtrak will be pressured to restore service at least at the tri-weekly level sooner rather than later, with a goal of making that daily in the near future. To do that, Amtrak needs new leadership who has a vision, a plan to build a large amount of new equipment so that additional routes can be added, and existing trains can be operated with adequate capacity.

[End quote]

[Begin quote]

The Amtrak report on service from New Orleans - Orlando comes as no surprise. It is typical of the work Amtrak puts out. In the 1990's Amtrak produced a report on Chicago–Milwaukee service which concluded that not only should there not be any more intermediate stops, but that ridership would be greatest if the then two existing stops, Sturtevant and Glenview, were eliminated, thereby allowing the service to run non-stop, i.e. faster.

We all said "Huh?". Then I figured out their mathematical model obviously factors in a speed/population combination that the faster the schedule, the more people are likely to turn from driving to the train. Of course this is mostly [junk science]. No speed up of five or 10 minutes between Chicago and Milwaukee is going to attract more passengers, especially since the current 92 minute schedule beats driving, anyway. Common sense and/or real knowledge of the area being served is not important to Amtrak planners.

[End quote]

[Begin quote]

Since I am very much in favor of the return rail passenger between New Orleans, Jacksonville and points south; I desire to post my comments.

The greatest problem is Amtrak is the originator of this report with no auditing agency to review and comment on this report. This report should have been contracted out to a professional consulting firm and submitted back to Congress. Especially when Amtrak – even the CEO Boardman's – bias' have recently been made known regarding the long distance train system and reluctance to turn in a new car order reveal a lack of concern and empathy for the traveling public.

In 1993, when the Sunset started serving the New Orleans, Jacksonville, and Miami segment, I suspected a problem when the word came back we can’t offer daily service since we need more train sets. It seems Amtrak’s Cardinal and Sunset are unwanted step-children, merely tolerated.

I find it interesting Amtrak is willing to take the Texas Eagle to Los Angeles but extend the City Of New Orleans to Florida? no way! Amtrak is willing to run a train from San Antonio to New Orleans, but why not continue that same train to Florida instead of a separate train from New Orleans to Florida? Why not restore the Floridian? Isn’t the real goal here to expand the system? Oh, I almost forgot, Amtrak needs more train sets!

You brought up an excellent point on interconnecting trains! By not restoring the Sunset to the New Orleans-Florida segment, leaving the segment vacant of train service is perhaps an even greater loss for the traveling public.

Thanks for allowing me to share my thoughts!

[End quote]

[Begin quote]

Where is the story on the St. Louis Cardinal's Baseball Team riding passenger trains for the first time in 40 years? It was on yesterday's NPR, that the team was riding Amtrak's Northeast Corridor.

[End quote]

Sorry, not being at all a follower of National Public Radio, and only a very, very casual observer of baseball, we missed that story.

[Begin quote]

Perhaps the good part of the "Sunset Report" is the fact it is the smoking gun of incompetence/lack of vision/dull thinking/passivity/ignorant-arrogance that is the decision making process of the present Board and management of Amtrak. There is no denying it! What to do? I always write my two senators and now have written Ray LaHood but, who is in a position to change the board and direct them to buy out the senior managers and replace them with competent people?

I am uncertain of the line of authority here ... I doubt if Vice President Biden will do anything, and I have gotten no response from Senator Durbin on another Amtrak matter. Perhaps the alternative of just pushing for private – Veolia for instance – companies to bid on new and existing routes would be more productive. Both BNSF and NS executives seem to have some entrepreneurial interest in a role in passenger service, and perhaps they should be encouraged to explore some ownership/management models.

Maybe putting the freight fox in the Amtrak board chicken coop would do something constructive? I am hoping this administration is open to new, collaborative ideas about building a 21st Century world class passenger railroad system which will include some bold moves on the Amtrak problem.

[End quote]

[Begin quote]

Is there any chance Veolia might be interested in taking over Amtrak lock, stock and barrel and then be given free reign? Seems like a WIN-WIN situation to me, for all concerned.

[End quote]

Our thanks to everyone who takes the time to write and share their thoughts and opinions. Regrettably, we are unable to share every e-mail due to space limitations, but we share those which are representative of groups of e-mail.

And, thank you to everyone who reads This Week at Amtrak; we continue to have a rapidly growing subscriber base.
　
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J. Bruce Richardson
President
United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.
1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203
Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA
Telephone 904-636-7739
brucerichardson@unitedrail.org
http://www.unitedrail.org

Thursday, July 23, 2009

This Week at Amtrak; July 25, 2009

This Week at Amtrak; July 25, 2009

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.
America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA
Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org

Volume 6, Number 24

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Response to the last This Week at Amtrak published Monday came fast and furious. The overwhelming sentiment was negative against Amtrak and the P.R.I.I.A. Section 226 Gulf Coast Service Plan Report as discussed in the last issue.

Here are some samples from the TWA mailbag. Every new paragraph represents a new quote by another individual writer.

[Begin quotes]

“Those crooks are so lost in extorting money they have absolutely forgotten their purpose is to operate a ‘national network of rail passenger services’.”

“I have in my possession a published SCL passenger timetable from December 1970. Could I just mail that to Mr. Boardman and say ‘here, can't you replicate this service?’.”

“I am totally incensed by Amtrak's total incompetence from Mr. Boardman down the line to middle management. 20 months to train onboard staff is absurd! What can the average person do to correct the culture of mediocrity?”

“Yeah, I read the report. In typical Am-logic, they establish a conclusion first, and then
‘manufacture’ facts and data to justify it! A new station at Sanford? Why? Good point. ... Yeah, you're right – [Congresswoman] Corrine Brown should request a refund and Boardman should resign. What a disgrace!”

“I was comforted that it wasn't only me that was . . . well . . . flabbergasted . . . at the audacity Amtrak had to issue such a publication. It's filled not only with numerous untruths, but it actually documents their ‘hidden’ agenda, which obviously is to impede and hinder hooking up east of New Orleans. Does this go unseen by those who SHOULD care? Now, if there are so many obstacles over the New Orleans to Florida issue, will Amtrak raise similar objections for restoring the Pioneer and/or the North Coast Limited? To my knowledge, I've not been made aware of Amtrak's viewpoint on this matter. The restoration of The Sunset Limited issues began previous to the Pioneer or NCL proposals; correct me if I'm mistaken.”

“Put two stakes in the ground with yellow tape between them and call it a station until one is built. Not running a train because of one station on the route is nonsense. And 20 months required to train the crews to do what? I worked at an airline and it took way less time to train our crews on the various aircraft they had to fly. Why is Amtrak dragging its feet on this route? It doesn't make sense. I hope they do extend the City of New Orleans ... then I can get on the train in Memphis and make the whole trip to Disney World! You think that Amtrak might try to market that? ... Nah.”

“I don't understand this nonsense about tri-weakly service either (misspelling intended). Then again, the Rio Grande Zephyr was a huge success, in spite of tri-weekly service. Yes, I know the Rockies aren't the Florida panhandle, plus the D&RGW folks ran a first class operation and had a huge amount of pride in their train. Always good to get your weekly newsletter and analysis.”

“Amtrak New Orleans-Orlando passenger service. Designed to fail. Amtrak's record of plans and implementation have been a failure, except for maintaining an inept bureaucracy. America's skeletal passenger train network is a carryover from decades ago, yet, Amtrak's board continues to perpetuate this as their primary purpose. The present Amtrak board has outlived their usefulness in today's world of American transportation. No disrespect to you and any of the advocates, but I cannot even suggest any choice when the inmates are running the asylum. I suggest you review the ‘be careful what you wish for’ quote, and listen to what your subconscious tells you.”

2) And, so the comments went. There was one comment from someone living on the Gulf Coast this space has a lot of respect for, and there were two other major comments, too.

“Amtrak is accomplishing precisely what they hoped to accomplish with their inaccurate, error-prone, agenda-driven, biased report – turn people against restoration of service. Anyone who doesn't understand the importance of the route to the national system, and also understand that Amtrak has intentionally put the worst possible spin on projected ridership will question whether return of Florida service is a wise decision. Amtrak should be ashamed and embarrassed, but they're not. Goal accomplished and business as usual inside Amtrak – protect the money machine, and not waste precious resources on anything as mundane as service to the passenger. Isn't it odd that spending money to run a train between New Orleans and Orlando simply scares them to death, but paying an Amtrak crew to lay around the pool at a New Orleans hotel for three days while the equipment sets idle [waiting for the return trip] seems likes a logical decision. Only at Amtrak would buffoonic moves such as these be made.”

[End quote]

3) For the major comments, first, United Rail Passenger Alliance Vice President of Law and Policy, and President of the Minnesota Association of Railroad Passengers, Andrew Selden of Minneapolis.

[Begin quote]

By Andrew Selden

TWA’s discussion of the intellectual failures of Amtrak's projections of usage of the various service alternatives across the New Orleans-Florida gap missed one of the most compelling bits of evidence: Amtrak's own experience with actual patterns of usage of this service when it existed.

One of the most striking passenger behaviors that evolved almost immediately upon extension of the Sunset Limited to Florida in 1993 was the spontaneous discovery by passengers and travel agents one could change trains in Jacksonville between the Sunset and trains to and from points NORTH of Jacksonville.

This is not a surprising result to anyone who understands networks in transportation systems. Matrix theory in mathematics predicts when a node (or a "hub") is created, traffic will flow through that hub in all possible directions, and the volume is approximately proportional to the square of the potential number of origin-destination pairs in the matrix.

So it didn't matter the one train – the Sunset – turned south at Jacksonville. Amtrak, of course, if they thought about it at all (no evidence exists that they did, before or after service was started), assumed customers would only go where the train went, to points south.

But passengers could read the timetable, and saw if they got off at Jacksonville, lo and behold, before too long a train would come through headed north into the Carolinas and Virginia, and even all the way to the Northeast. So people bought tickets and constructed their own connections, sometimes enduring unreasonably long waits for the connecting train. But through they went, generating "ridership" – and more importantly revenues – and much longer trips (output, measured in revenue passenger miles). United Rail Passenger Alliance founder Austin Coates documented this phenomenon by going into the Jacksonville station, and talking to passengers and ticket agents. They all understood what was happening, but Amtrak didn't: their systems only saw the local tickets to and from Jacksonville, not the fact it was the same folks passing through Jacksonville.

Amtrak's blindness to inter-route through traffic is further exacerbated by its bias – Amtrak sees itself mostly as operating a high-cost transit service in the Northeast Corridor and other short corridors. Many short trains, running discontiguous short routes, accommodating time-insensitive customers, who won't use the service (Amtrak assumes) if they have to change vehicles to reach their own destination.

It is an old shibboleth of urban transit planners that a connection for a journey will cut potential patronage ("ridership") by 50% or more as compared to operating a through train and/or bus or trolley. That notion is false, of course, but Amtrak's planners didn't get the memo. So to them, potential passengers are not likely to use a long distance service which requires a change of trains, and so only a few riders are to be expected to want to change trains at a place like Jacksonville. In Amtrak’s projection, little or no allowance is made for the potential usage or resulting revenue of someone who might choose to use rail to get from Houston to Raleigh, North Carolina or Mobile, Alabama to Boston via Jacksonville, even if that means a short layover at Jacksonville.

But, people are willing to do that. We know that not because of a theory or a forecast, but because of actual historical patterns of usage, of which Amtrak is either ignorant or which it is willing to try to hide, when it really doesn't want to do the work of running the train in the first place.

Our casual analysis suggested the comparatively few passengers who hubbed at Jacksonville between points west and points north of there were generating enough revenue (from their entire trip's fare, not just the fare for the segment taken on the Sunset) to pay all or most of the direct, above-the-rail, cost to operate the Sunset east of New Orleans. Everyone else was gravy. And, of course, all that occurred spontaneously, without benefit of any advertising or promotional support, fare promotions, or any other marketing.

And – at the time – the phenomenon was sharply limited by the lack of capacity on the Silver Star and Silver Meteor, especially in sleepers, to handle any serious growth in traffic. We believe if additional capacity had been available on the Silver trains, especially in first class, there would have been MUCH more connecting traffic at Jacksonville than there was. There is no way to estimate how much revenue Amtrak lost for lack of understanding. And, when the Sunset was discontinued east of New Orleans and the connection lost, ridership and revenue of the Silver trains to and from Florida was diminished accordingly.

Thus, Amtrak's craven failure this year to account properly for inter-route connecting revenue and ridership is really no surprise, either as a methodological failure, or a political scam. But, it is both disappointing and dishonest, and reflects a very serious lost opportunity to serve the public and to make money.

[End quote

Noted rail historian Daniel Carleton of Dunnellon, Florida had this to add, thinking along the lines of last weekend’s 40th anniversary of American man on the moon.

[Begin quote]

Mission Control … What is our mission?

By Daniel Carleton

As a nation we look back with pride to that day 40 years ago when humankind, humankind of American citizenry, set foot on Earth’s first and foremost satellite. It was the pinnacle of our civilization and became the benchmark for all technological leaps… or lack thereof; “We can land a man on the moon but we can’t …”

During these intervening four decades we have seen substantial changes in the size and scope of human enterprise. Due to the evident realities concerning what resources are actually available we have readjusted our views concerning our endeavors. Man has not been back to the moon since 1972. Commercial supersonic flight ended in 2002. And on the ground, intercity rail transportation became the ward of the National Rail Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak, in 1971. In Amtrak’s 38 years we have seen it expand and contract, rise and fall, lauded and condemned. With all the talk these days of “High Speed Rail” one may conclude the future mission of passenger rail is, in NASA parlance, “ago.”

So it was with great dismay that on July 16th of this year Amtrak released its “Gulf Coast Service Plan Report;” ironically on the same day of the states’ deadline for Pre-Applications for High-Speed Passenger Rail Funding. Although appearing comprehensive, the inaccuracy of detail leads one to believe it was conceived by one either not familiar with the area of proposed service or counting on those reading it would not be familiar.

The Report calls for “$10.7 million” for restoration of stations including “$3.2 million for the demolition and reconstruction of the Sanford, Florida station.” This should not be confused with the southern terminus of the Auto Train. The regular passenger station in Sanford is between the active stations in Winter Park and DeLand, and is passed daily by the current pair of New York to Miami trains. However, unlike other now vacant stations in Florida, Sanford was abandoned years ago due to very low passenger loadings. Why should the restoration of Gulf Coast service shoulder the cost of rebuilding a station with low boardings?

Also cited is “$600,000 for improvements at Amtrak’s Sanford maintenance facility where equipment would be maintained.” When the Sunset Limited was running prior to 2005 it was adequately maintained at the Auto-Train terminal in Sanford. Sanford is already in line for $2 million in maintenance area funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act; this does not include the $10 million new Auto Train passenger station. Why should the restoration of Gulf Coast service shoulder the cost of unnecessary improvements?

The least expensive option for restoration of service is the reestablishment of the tri-weekly Sunset Limited. However, the “major issue associated with this option is the route length. The route length (2,763 miles) presented significant operational challenges for the pre-Hurricane Katrina Sunset Limited with respect to equipment servicing, operational performance, crew scheduling and other issues.” This is a curious statement as Amtrak is planning to operate a daily Texas Eagle from Chicago to Los Angeles (2728 miles) as noted in the August 2009 issue of Trains magazine. Does 35 miles make that much of a difference? Or does Amtrak intend to discontinue this train when it is deemed convenient?

As of this early date at least two “advocates” listed in the Report as having been contacted have denied any such correspondence.

This action, or more accurately inaction, on the part of Amtrak is an insult to the people of the State of Florida, the Gulf Coast, and adds insult to injury to those left in New Orleans. What is Amtrak’s mission? Are they or are they not our national passenger railroad? If not, so be it; let us find another medium for rail transportation. If so, then where is our train? At a time when we should be working toward a stable and responsible means of ground transportation we are handed a 78-page report which says, in essence, “no, we can’t.” Remember this point, if New Orleans and the Gulf Coast had been mercifully spared the wrath of Katrina in 2005, would not the Sunset Limited still be running today?

[End quote]

4) Reports like the Gulf Coast Report make it difficult to snuggle up close to Amtrak and make nice. The report showed everyone – politicians, railroaders, passengers, American taxpayers – the worst and most arrogant side of Amtrak. We’ve seen a company with no solid or permanent leadership, no vision for the future, no regard for its basic mission for existence.

Then, we come to the following two press releases. Read them carefully.

[Begin quote]

Veolia Transportation Names Former Amtrak CEO As Chairman of its Rail Division

CHICAGO – June 17, 2009 – Veolia Transportation Inc. announced that Tom Downs has joined the company as chairman of its rail division. Downs will work with Rail Executive Vice President Ron Hartman to continue Veolia Transportation’s growth as the largest private provider of contracted passenger rail services in the U.S.

As chairman, Downs will help guide the company’s strategic planning efforts as well as its expanding roster of public private partnerships, and catalyze the development of its high-speed rail business. He will further develop the company’s relationships and alliances with key organizations in the public and private sectors, including the Federal Railway Administration, Federal Transit Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, as well as transit authorities and city governments. Downs also will provide assistance with operations, continuing to enhance performance in safety, maintenance, customer service, technology and maintenance of way.

In his distinguished career in transportation, Downs has held several executive roles. As CEO of AMTRAK, Downs was credited with leading the national passenger rail system from insolvency to a $2 billion capital investment fund in 1998. He also has served as commissioner of transportation in New Jersey and as president of the Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority. As city administrator of the District of Columbia in the 1980s, Downs oversaw the restoration of Union Station.

From 2003 to 2008, Downs was CEO of the Eno Transportation Foundation, a forum for the discussion of emerging issues and policies in all fields of transportation. Prior to that, he directed the National Center for Smart Growth Education and Research at the University of Maryland.

“Tom brings a powerful combination of strategic depth, integrity and a proven record of successful leadership in rail to Veolia Transportation,” said Mark Joseph, CEO of Veolia Transportation. “The experience he has gained in leading several of the most respected entities in the rail industry will be a tremendous asset to our rapidly growing rail business and to our clients.”

“I am very pleased to be joining Veolia Transportation as I believe they have the competence, capacity for innovation and values that will assure their continued leadership in the industry,” said Downs. “As the company continues to grow over the next 10 years, we will bring groundbreaking advances in commuter and high-speed rail service to cities and transit authorities in North America. Veolia Transportation is committed to setting the standard in safe and sustainable mobility solutions through genuine partnerships with clients and superb execution, and I share these commitments.”

About Veolia Transportation

Veolia Transportation is the largest private-sector operator of multiple modes of transit in North America, including bus, rail, paratransit, shuttle, sedan and taxi services. The company has over 17,000 employees and operates some 150 contracts in multiple modes of transit for cities in North America. The company operates several major commuter rail networks in the U.S., including Boston, San Diego, Austin, Los Angeles and Miami and is an integrated manager and operator, providing a range of rail services to clients.

Veolia Transportation is part of Veolia Transport, the world’s largest private operator of multiple modes of public transit, including bus, rail, paratransit, shuttle, ferry and taxi services. Veolia Transport operates contracts for 5,000 city transit authorities in 27 countries, and transports 2.5 billion passengers per year. The Company operates some of the most sophisticated rail systems in the world in Australia, Germany, The Netherlands, and the UK.

For more information, visit www.veoliatransportation.com

[End quote]

[Begin quote]

Veolia Transportation Names COO of Its Rail Division

CHICAGO – July 20, 2009 – Veolia Transportation announced today that Donald Saunders has been named chief operating officer of the company’s Rail Division. Saunders, who joins Veolia Transportation from Amtrak, will report to Executive Vice President – Rail Ron Hartman and work with the rail management team to advance Veolia Transportation as the largest provider of contracted rail services in the United States.

Saunders joins a management team committed to setting the standard for passenger rail operations in North America. As COO, he will focus on day-to-day operations and operational execution to ensure that Veolia Transportation is continually exceeding the expectations of passengers and clients. He will also participate in the company’s strategic planning efforts.

“Don has extensive experience in many parts of the passenger rail industry and an excellent track record,” said Hartman. While working at Amtrak in the Central Region, Don dramatically improved the operational performance of the trains he managed, including the operation of 60 daily intercity trains and dispatching of 300 Chicago commuter trains.

“Veolia Transportation has a global reputation for being an innovative company that cares about the safety and well-being of customers and employees,” said Saunders. “I look forward to helping them achieve their mission of being best in class through strong partnerships and commitments to clients and employees.”

Prior to joining Veolia Transportation, Saunders had a long career in various executive positions at Amtrak. Most recently, he was assistant vice president of the west region for policy and development. His key responsibilities in this role included business development, including developing and implementing plans for stimulus-related projects, and for new future service possibilities. He successfully negotiated contracts with the Departments of Transportation in three western states.

About Veolia Transportation

Veolia Transportation is the largest private sector operator of multiple modes of transit in North America, including bus, rail, paratransit, shuttle, sedan and taxi services. The company has a workforce of over 20,000 people and operates over 200 transportation contracts in 22 states and two Canadian Provinces. The company manages and operates transportation services in leading U.S. cities, including Las Vegas, San Diego, Phoenix, Denver, Baltimore, Atlanta, San Francisco and Los Angeles, as well as several major rail networks, including Boston, San Diego, Los Angeles, Miami and Austin. (www.veolia-transport.com/en)

Veolia Transportation is part of Veolia Transport, the world’s largest private operator of multiple modes of transit, including bus, rail, paratransit, shuttle, ferry and taxi services. Veolia Transport operates contracts for 5,000 city transit authorities in 28 countries, and completes 2.63 billion passenger trips per year. (www.veolia-transport.com/en/)

[End quote]

Ron Hartman, Veolia’s Executive Vice President here in North America has been putting together a blockbuster team of transit and passenger railroaders. Adding Tom Downs is a plum for Veolia (After all, transit is what Mr. Downs does best; not intercity passenger rail.) when dealing with various state governors and city mayors, plus an assortment of other politicians.

Good railroaders like Don Saunders add huge strength to the company.

Ron Hartman is a well-respected former Amtrak executive, with excellent private experience, too. He is earnest and hard working, and he is not someone to be taken lightly; he knows his business.

Now, go back and reread the last two paragraphs of both press releases. French company Veolia is a huge, powerful worldwide player in every field it enters, including transit and passenger rail. This is a company with a lot of clout, a boatload of money, huge political muscle, and an executive cadre not to be messed with. If you don’t believe everything you read in those last two paragraphs of the press releases, visit the company’s web site. You’ll be convinced these people are important – and highly relevant.

Look to the future. Here’s Veolia with all of this money, all of this talent, all of this experience. What if someone wanted to start a regional rail operation ... who better than Veolia to run it? As a private, for-profit company, Veolia is automatically much leaner and more focused than Amtrak, and has a work ethic far, far different from Amtrak, especially after what we have seen in last week’s Gulf Coast Report. What if Veolia had produced that report? Do you think the conclusions would have been the same? No, they would have been radically different, with a dozen different ways to make that service work, instead of three examples and all of the reasons why the service can’t work. (Ron Hartman alone would have made sure of that, even without the other new guys.)

Every city, town, and hamlet in America is clamoring for high speed rail. A puny $8 billion to be distributed this year goes against so far over $100 billion in requests by states. Everything is up for grabs. Even Amtrak? Well, possibly so.

What if Veolia gets in the operations door for high speed rail? There is no mandate for Amtrak to have those contracts automatically. (Indeed, the Gulf Coast Report makes a huge argument for Amtrak to be pushed as far away as possible from those contracts.)

So, think outside the box, because that’s what everyone but Amtrak is trying to do today. Let’s say Veolia (or one of its competitors other than Amtrak) gets one or two high speed routes to operate. Well, to make the contract complete, how about putting some of the existing connecting long distance or regional or short distance Amtrak routes into that contract, to make a nice, efficient, connected bundle? A couple of votes from Congress and that could happen. Amtrak may currently have a monopoly on passenger rail in this country, but it does not have a monopoly on political clout.

Imagine for a moment you’re a planning executive at one of the major freight railroads. We just saw earlier this month Norfolk Southern’s CEO is willing to talk about passenger rail. If one is talking about it, mostly likely others at competing railroads are, too. Suppose you see an opportunity in passenger rail, but your passenger department has been long gone for nearly four decades. Where do you go to find and populate a new passenger department?

Why go anywhere further than Veolia? Don’t hire individual passenger department employees, just sign a contract with Veolia to handle the whole thing for you. No muss, no fuss, and you’ve got instant professionals handling things to your specifications. If things don’t work out, well, don’t renew the contract, and don’t worry about having to get rid of a huge pool of employees. They all belong to Veolia, not you.

Ron Hartman’s Veolia has become the 800 pound gorilla in the room when it comes to transit and regional passenger rail. The desire is there, the financial muscle is there, the deep bench of talent is there, the vision (Amtrak, are you paying attention?) is there. Veolia through its normal lines of business wants to grow and expand, not contract or merely maintain, as Amtrak is, because it is always depending on someone else’s good graces or funding and does not have the will to accept normal growth.

If you were Amtrak and you had a lick of sense, would you be looking over your corporate shoulder?

5) Oh, and look at the date. Five months from today is Christmas Day!

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J. Bruce Richardson
President
United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.
1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203
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Monday, July 20, 2009

This Week at Amtrak; July 20, 2009

This Week at Amtrak; July 20, 2009

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.
America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA
Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org

Volume 6, Number 23

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) The Amtrak Board of Directors should be furious about this document. Amtrak Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman, since this document was issued during his stewardship, should be fired immediately. The Amtrak planning department should be outright ashamed of themselves and simply die of embarrassment they took a paycheck for producing such an untoward piece of drivel and written chicanery.

We can only be discussing the July 16, 2009 issuance of Amtrak’s P.R.I.I.A. Section 226 Gulf Coast Service Plan Report, mandated last year by the Amtrak reauthorization. Congresswoman Corrine Brown, who placed a million dollars into Amtrak’s free federal money handout last year deserves a refund for her efforts. At 77 pages long, plus the cover, $12,820.51 for each page will long be noted by government watchdogs as one of the greatest misuses of money in the modern history of the United States government. Certainly, when Congresswoman Brown threw Amtrak this generous bone she most likely never dreamed Amtrak would come back with such an insulting document to her, her constituents, and American taxpayers.

The report is an outright disgrace and complete misrepresentation of facts to restore service east of New Orleans to Orlando, Florida after the Sunset Limited was “temporarily” discontinued in August of 2005 because of the onslaught of Hurricane Katrina. Four years later, Amtrak’s planning department and Joe Boardman expect us to believe their fantasy document provides any credence whatsoever as to what it will take to restore service over the Sunset Limited route along the Gulf Coast.

2) Here’s a summary of the document by one interested observer who has contributed accurate reporting to this space in the past. Then, we’ll take a close look at the nuts and bolts of this written travesty that one other commentator who exposed his complete lack of knowledge of the railroad world incorrectly called “a realistic assessment of existing difficulties.”

First, the correct summary.

[Begin quote]

After reading the Amtrak report I basically held my thoughts and comments until I had a chance to see the input from people within the group who are much more knowledgeable about running a rail passenger system than am I. I believe I can say without exception none of the reports I've read are optimistic or approving of Amtrak's report which is precisely my opinion from the minute I finished reading it.

With the single exception of the report indicating that regardless of which option was selected it would include sleepers between New Orleans and Orlando this was a disheartening report. This inclusion of sleepers was not intimated in the oral reports given to this point concerning the "new train" (Option 3).

Option 1 (tri-weekly Sunset Limited) seemed to be the least desirable based on oral comments simply because of the odd arrangement of having a daily "stub" train arriving in New Orleans (this stub train was made to sound like all but a certainty), but continuing to Orlando only with a tri-weekly schedule. This naturally meant playing havoc with anyone trying to travel through New Orleans to points East. Yet the written report makes Option 1 appear as the best option based on several points. Option 2 (City of New Orleans) appeared to possibly be the best option based on early reports, but the written report makes it sound undesirable on several points.

It's obvious to even the most casual reader that the primary recurring theme from Amtrak is that they don't want to reinstate any service between New Orleans and Orlando. They do not say that specifically, but by any interpretation of the facts they've done everything they can to make the return of the route as difficult as possible from inflated costs to inflated time frames and convoluted passenger counts and miles. I would love to know the real reason Amtrak absolutely is not interested in running a New Orleans-Orlando train. Might be interesting.

There is little doubt that there has been for years strong opponents of Amtrak (with the Sunset being the punching bag). However, many of those voices of dissent have been silenced or at least muffled to a large extent. We have a president and Congress professing strong support for passenger rail, and actually providing funding. It would seem if ever there was a good time to push expansion and improvement of Amtrak it would be now.

Yet Amtrak seems to still be on the wrong track as usual. I've never seen a company run only for the benefit of the management and employees instead of the customers as is Amtrak. This is what comes from a government-funded company I guess. Their goal seems to be to get more and more government money, but they don't seem to know what to do with it. Amtrak management does not seem to have a plan. They can't even decide whether they want to have long-distance trains. They can't decide the best way to manage the Northeast Corridor. They can't decide how to manage dining car concepts. They can't decide what kinds of cars to order. They can't decide what routes to operate. They can't decide whether to have High Speed Rail or even what HSR is.

If Amtrak were a private company they would have gone bankrupt a long time ago. However, American management can't seem to operate auto companies, banks or insurance companies either. Maybe we shouldn't expect them to be able to operate a rail-passenger corporation. Possibly we should replace the entire Amtrak management team with Japanese rail executives. They seem to have no trouble running passenger rail. I cannot possibly see how it couldn't help but be an improvement.

I for one am fed up with Amtrak's lack of leadership, vision, planning, and just general inability to function effectively. If I remember correctly we paid $1 million for this "informative" report which basically tells us all the reasons Amtrak doesn't want to reinstate service to Orlando. We already knew that. I'm tired of seeing my tax money being wasted by an incompetent company.

If they had just reinstated the train when CSX opened the route all of this could have been avoided. Instead of telling us why they can't reinstate it now we'd be talking about how best to improve service on the route. You don't have to be a rail expert to know this is a snow job which is the one thing Amtrak has perfected during their existence. I've waited four years to catch a train in Pensacola, and now the best they can tell me is that it likely will be four more years if ever. Enough is enough. What a crock. I've no more patience with this nonsense.

Our only hope is if Congress puts their collective foot up Amtrak's posterior, and tells them to make things happen or they'll find people who can. Without that it's going to be business (or no business) as usual for years to come.

[End quote]

3) Amtrak says the dog ate its homework, so it can only do so much to restore service between New Orleans and Orlando. It lists three options, two of which are pretty reasonable.

The first option is to restore the service as it was before, re-extending the Sunset Limited (or it’s named replacement service) from New Orleans to Orlando on a tri-weekly basis, using the same maintenance facility at Sanford, Florida, a suburb of Orlando, as it previously successfully used for a decade.

The second option is to extend the City of New Orleans, operating from Chicago to New Orleans via Memphis, Tennessee, to Orlando, an option long sought by United Rail Passenger Alliance. This option would – for the first time since 1979 – provide single train service between Chicago and Florida, with a schedule which feeds all of the western transcontinental trains eastbound into Chicago to cross-platform travelers to the City and to Florida.

The third option is to recreate the old Seaboard Air Line/Louisville & Nashville joint train, the Gulf Wind, as a stand-alone train between New Orleans and Jacksonville, Florida, and extend it down to Orlando. The Gulf Wind was discontinued on Amtrak Day in 1971, and the service was eventually replaced by the Sunset Limited’s tri-weekly schedule in 1993 until Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005.

4) Amtrak’s report has such blatantly false numbers as a basis for the document, and the assumptions use such discredited junk science in the transportation industry, that it’s tough to zero in on a starting point. So, the most understandable thing to do is to go through the report as presented and point out the numerous inaccuracies – and, frankly, outright lies – as stated.

Here’s the first laugh: “The service remains suspended today because of the cost and challenges associated with restoring service to this route.” Really? CSX, the primary host railroad of the route, which suffered considerable damage from Hurricane Katrina, had the track up and running and available to Amtrak on April 1, 2006. The CSX efforts included replacing huge stretches of track, bridges, signaling, switches, and every type of railroad infrastructure in the wake of Katrina. Amtrak’s relatively small challenges of rehabbing stations (many of which are municipally owned) pale in comparison to what CSX (and Norfolk Southern on its Crescent line into New Orleans just to the north of the CSX line along the Gulf Coast) had to accomplish, and was able to accomplish in seven months. Of course, the difference is CSX is a private, for-profit company, and every hour the railroad was out of service was an hour of revenue lost. In the case of Amtrak, it could blow off the service and still turn to Congress for more money with yet another, ongoing sob story. When there is no accountability, there is no progress.

The report notes a $10.7 million cost for restoring stations along the route, including $3.2 million for the demolition and reconstruction of the Sanford, Florida station, which was damaged from other hurricane preceding Katrina.

Whoops! The Sanford station is also on the route of the Silver Meteor and Silver Star. The reasons Amtrak gave for closing the station initially had absolutely nothing to do with the Sunset Limited, but rather because Amtrak said there were enough other stations in the area (DeLand, Winter Park, Orlando, and Kissimmee), and Sanford served no useful purpose, plus eliminating the Sanford station stop sped up train schedules.

Also, on an adjoining piece of property to the old Atlantic Coast Line Sanford station and division office building, Amtrak is using stimulus money to build a brand new Auto Train station and terminal.

Now, Amtrak is telling us it wants another $3.2 million – charged directly to the restoration of the Sunset Limited route – to build another new Sanford station that will also serve the Silver Meteor and Silver Star? If this station is built for the restored service, will the Meteor and Star also use it? If this station is important enough to the overall financial health of this route, why wait for this service to be restored; why isn’t the station in some other vision plan for the future? And, better yet, why wasn’t the Auto Train’s new terminal planned and constructed so it could serve both the mainline trains and the Auto Train, too?

The other $7.5 million will be used to upgrade a relatively new station in Pensacola, Florida, and the old Seaboard Air Line station in Tallahassee, which was well out of the way of Katrina. Amtrak said in the report this money would be used to add American With Disabilities Act requirements to the stations, which, most when built or reconfigured for service in 1993 met most of those requirements.

The one major station project to be undertaken is a completely new station in Mobile, Alabama. That building was severely damaged by Katrina to the point CSX sold the damaged building to a real estate developer since it was in such bad shape. A completely new facility will have to be created in Mobile. However, as anyone who has ever traveled around the country on Amtrak knows, there have been many stations in large cities and small hamlets which have functioned well using an Amshack trailer for a building, and later permanent construction considered. St. Louis Union Trailers is perhaps the most famous of these stations, with new construction coming after decades of “temporary” shelter. A single station in Mobile should not be enough to hold up this project; most of the passenger platforms in Mobile are still in place and serviceable.

The report states a cost of $600,000 for improvements at Amtrak’s Sanford maintenance facility. Well, prior to Katrina, the Sunset’s equipment base was in Sanford, and the maintenance crews there did an exemplary job of maintaining the train. Why, now, more than half a million dollars for upgrades? Is it just because as long as Amtrak is making a wish list or a discouragement list, this $600,000 of Other Peoples Money is necessary?

Amtrak’s report makes an assumption $20 million will be necessary to install Positive Train Control (PTC), as required by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 by 2015 on portions of the route solely because of restoration of passenger service. This is an issue we will delve into in a very soon future issue of This Week at Amtrak. CSX had indicated some of the current route may be downgraded because it can route some of its hazmat and other trains requiring the use of PTC on a similar route via Montgomery, Alabama.

5) One of the biggest ticket items in the report is alleged additional passenger rolling stock which would be required to operate either an extended City of New Orleans (two train sets) or a new overnight Gulf Wind (the same number of new cars). Amtrak estimates the need of between six and 14 new passenger cars, at a cost of $24 million to $63 million.

This is perhaps one of the most incredible and ludicrous parts of the report. Amtrak says it could take up to four years (yes, you read that right) to get either of these trains running because that is the time to design, plan, order, and build new passenger cars specifically for this route. Such hogwash.

A review of Amtrak’s current System Fleet Pan for Fiscal Year 2009 indicates after the few Superliners which will be taken out of the wreck line and restored with stimulus funds monies, 32 Superliners of every description, including coaches, diners, lounges, and sleepers will still be available to be taken out of storage and rebuilt for service. Even if Amtrak needs the maximum number of 14 cars it says it does, that still leave another 18 Superliners to be restored for other uses. New cars, designed and built specifically for this service? Why? Amtrak already owns all of the cars it needs; it’s a question of using existing assets through rebuilds and rehabilitation instead of the lengthy and expensive process of creating a new fleet of cars. In the report, Amtrak says it could cost up to $63 million to buy these new cars. If every car to be rebuilt cost as much as $1.5 million to rebuild (that follows what Amtrak is spending in stimulus funds currently for rebuilding Superliner cars), that a tab of only $21 million, not up to $63 million. It must be wonderful to plan and spend Other Peoples Money with great abandon when you have no accountability.

But, wait! you implore. Some of those Superliners are slated to be used IF the Pioneer is restored or IF the North Coast Limited is restored. Yes, that may be so. First come, first served. If the restoration of the Sunset’s route can fill that crucial gap before the gaps of the Pioneer and the North Coast Limited are ready to be filled, get in line, folks.

6) When we start delving into the financial aspects of this report, things become more complicated. Amtrak makes several wrong assumptions.

The report says ridership was a primary consideration in selecting the three preferred route options. Amtrak says if option one is used, and a tri-weekly Sunset Limited is restored, ridership will be 53,300 a year. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, an average of 45% of the Sunset’s ridership and revenues came from east of New Orleans. In FY 08, the Sunset, operating only west of New Orleans, had ridership of 71,700 passengers. A projection of 53,300 (171 passengers per trip) is probably the closest thing to a legitimate number in the entire report, although that figure could probably be altered up by 25% and still be a legitimate figure.

Everyone knows in the real, non-Amtrak world, business plan forecasts always figure revenue low and expenses high. Amtrak, of course, being Amtrak, has taken this to heart and grossly distorted its numbers for ridership, revenue, and expenses.

Option two, the extension of the City of New Orleans, creating a single train route from Chicago to Orlando, has the greatest chance of success, and Amtrak terribly underestimates its potential. Today’s City of New Orleans has ridership of 197,400 per year (FY 08), and Amtrak says an extended version of that will only bring in an additional 96,100 passengers on the haul to Orlando.

They are saying the system’s only Chicago-Florida train, with the Empire Builder, California Zephyr, Southwest Chief, Lake Shore Limited, and all of the Chicago regional trains feeding into the City would only generate additional business to Florida, projected to be less than half of what the City carries today between Chicago and New Orleans via Memphis. One has to wonder exactly what Amtrak’s planning department is smoking on their lunch breaks. It’s unlikely enough equipment could be found on this train to make it 18 cars which would serve as a replacement for the long, lost Floridian, gone since 1979.

Option three, a reconstituted and stretched Gulf Wind, running as a stand-alone train between New Orleans and Orlando on an overnight schedule is, according to Amtrak, the most expensive to operate and not very productive, with a predicted ridership of 79,900, because, as Amtrak says, the train would have to have connecting passengers from the eastbound Sunset Limited successor, and the southbound City of New Orleans. Amtrak uses old and discredited junk science to say passengers will not want to detrain at New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal, spend a few hours in the Crescent City, and entrain for a late afternoon departure and midday arrival in Orlando.

Uh, lessee, well, airlines create their entire route systems around hubs, and passengers hub for bus travel, too. Amtrak expects all of its passengers north of New York City to hub in Washington for Florida trains and the Crescent, after arriving there on Northeast Corridor trains. Lots and lots and lots of passengers hub every day in Chicago for destinations all over the country, and Los Angeles is a big hub, too, not to mention Seattle and Portland, Oregon, and a half a dozen other hubs in the Amtrak system.

So, why is there a dire prediction about hubbing in New Orleans? Is this just another use of discredited junk science to make the report read badly so no service will be restored east of New Orleans? What is the prejudice the Amtrak planners have about those of us living in Florida or along the Gulf Coast? Is there some sort of genetic trait we have that makes us unworthy of passenger train travel? Do these people think all we do is marry our cousins and drink beer and never want to travel?

Here’s something else to put a smile on your face. Amtrak’s planners say the route between New Orleans and Orlando is adversely impacted by the circuitry of the rail route, a passenger train having to travel 769 miles versus 639 miles by automobile, and what it calls slow speeds which result in a trip time of 18.5 hours versus 9.6 by automobile.

Well. If that’s the case, why doesn’t Amtrak just turn out the lights and go home? It’s also much faster to travel from Jacksonville, Florida to Richmond, Virginia by automobile (less than 10 hours) than by Amtrak (12 and a half hours). But, that doesn’t mean everyone wants – or is able – to drive. It’s also much, much quicker to take a jet airplane, but that’s not always comfortable or easy or desirable for everyone, either.

The point of travel by train is just that – travel by train. Every individual train in Amtrak’s system to connected to every other train in the system through the matrix theory. Everything connects with everything (although, sometimes inconveniently), and every train feeds other trains.

Amtrak’s rather boorish presumption a new Gulf wind will only haul local business, and only haul those who want to avoid driving is hogwash. Amtrak provides a viable travel choice. Most likely, the Amtrak planning department denizens would be shocked to know someone from Washington State or Oregon may have an interest in riding a new Gulf Wind between New Orleans and Tallahassee or Jacksonville, or Palatka or DeLand or Orlando. That’s the beauty of the matrix theory. To presume little or no traffic from connecting trains, especially strong feeders like the City of New Orleans and a daily Sunset Limited (or replacement of that named train) west of New Orleans is like saying a gas station on an Interstate highway exit will only sell gas to local residents, and no travelers from other areas will ever stop at the station.

7) Let’s use the existing City of New Orleans as a model for this route. The City’s route is similar in length, 926 miles versus the projected length of 769 miles. The City begins in Chicago and ends in New Orleans, and has only one other major city on its route – Memphis, Tennessee. It has a number of smaller cities and state capitals along its route, such as Jackson, Mississippi. Much of the route of the City is rural, such as the route between New Orleans and Jacksonville, Florida. Since the southern terminal for the proposed Gulf Wind is Orlando, one of the world’s largest vacation destinations, the travel data for that city equals – if not exceeds – that of Chicago.

Let’s look at the characteristics of the City of New Orleans for FY 2008.

Total Revenue – $14,864,600
Passenger Miles – 93,433,000
Ridership – 197,400
Average Length of Trip – 473.3 miles
Train Miles – 666,000
Passengers per Train Mile – 140.3
Revenue per Passenger Mile – 15.91 cents
Load Factor – 63.8%
Available Seat Miles – 146,375,952

Here’s what Amtrak estimates for the three options east of New Orleans to Orlando.

Option One, Tri-Weekly extension of the Sunset Limited (or named replacement service)
Ridership – 53,300

Option Two, Extension of the City of New Orleans from New Orleans to Orlando
Ridership – 96,100

Option Three, Creation of a new stand-alone, connecting train, labeled the Gulf Wind by Amtrak
Ridership – 79,900

Amtrak says it used its normal methods to determine ridership, including “Ridership and revenue impacts for each alternative were estimated utilizing models and data Amtrak has developed to measure the impact of now or changed services. The inputs included surveys of Amtrak’s long distance passengers; socio-economic data; and forecasts of population and income in the areas served by each station.” Amtrak goes on correctly to say it includes data between Jacksonville and Orlando where a third frequency would increase travel opportunities for the Silver Meteor and Silver Star, and therefore, that ridership would grow, too.

What Amtrak did not bother to measure is overall passenger traffic along the line. Using Amtrak’s data, it is all based on population, and only the desire of the local population to travel. It does not account for incoming traffic from other routes or other parts of the country, and it does not account for Amtrak’s typical one tenth of one percent of the domestic transportation output Amtrak commands.

When using real data, we discover Interstate 10 parallels the route between New Orleans and Jacksonville, Florida, and on any given day at any given intermediate rural point (outside of local traffic using the Interstate in such places as Jacksonville, Tallahassee, Pensacola, etc.), an average of 36,000 to 70,000 passenger vehicles (excluding trucks hauling freight) pass a measuring point on the Interstate. What Amtrak is projecting a year for ridership, the Interstate hosts in a day, and we are unable to measure how many occupants are in each vehicle.

The same holds true for air transportation. When culling city pair information from the government’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics, we learn travelers between Chicago and Orlando are measured in six and seven figure numbers, not counting other intermediate city pairs along this route.

As previously stated, Amtrak also eschews any real cross-platform business in New Orleans to bolster its numbers. It presumes people will not intentionally schedule connections from one train route to another. Apparently, Amtrak’s planning department, located in Washington, never bothers to stroll through Washington Union Station to see the millions of annual riders who make train connections there, or the millions who connect through Chicago or other points.

Therefore, Amtrak’s numbers for ridership, expenses, and every other category beyond basic diesel fuel are not credible.

Looking at the ridership and revenue passenger mile figures for the present City of New Orleans we see numbers which are double what Amtrak projects for east of New Orleans. These numbers are a more accurate barometer than Amtrak’s report numbers.

8) One final point. Amtrak’s report says the company wants an incredible 20 months or more to recruit and train operating personnel for this route.

Why?

Back in 1993 (before HD television), it took Amtrak substantially less than a year to – from scratch – create this service on a tri-weekly basis east of New Orleans. Apparently, the “can do” people who were running Amtrak at that time must be long gone, replaced by a group comfortable in their government-subsidized paychecks with no worries in the world, and no hurry to fulfill Amtrak’s national mission of providing passenger service to the lower 48 states.

Twenty months? Even if it has been four years since the Sunset last operated east of New Orleans, many of the train and engine crew members are still employees of Amtrak, just working other routes

9) There is much more ground to cover, but you get the idea. Amtrak fraudulently wasted $1 million of taxpayer money creating a worthless document with false data, incorrect assumptions, and incomplete conclusions.

This type of fiasco has been going on for far too long at Amtrak. Interim President and CEO Joseph Boardman has been in office for nine months now, and this was created under his stewardship. He is ultimately responsible. He needs to be gone, at the earliest moment.

It’s worth noting a phrase from the last edition of TWA, taken from the Amtrak This Week employee publication story about the first restored passenger car coming out of the shops.

[Begin quote]

“An expanded fleet is a critical part of our ability to grow,” said Vice President of Policy and Development Stephen Gardner. “We need these cars as we pursue new service in partnership with states and also to increase capacity along existing routes where demand exceeds what we can currently offer.”

[End quote]

Still no future vision, still no business plan better than gouging individual states for money for short distance trains. If Mr. Gardner’s statement holds true, then Amtrak truly isn’t interested in expanding the long distance system and the entire $1 million exercise was just done to appease a Member of Congress.

So, at this point, is Amtrak worth saving? Or, is it time for a complete make over with an entire new leadership team which will have the ability to unleash the power and potential of Amtrak and allow many of the good managers and executives there to do their jobs properly and with some enthusiasm?

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J. Bruce Richardson
President
United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.
1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203
Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA
Telephone 904-636-7739
brucerichardson@unitedrail.org
http://www.unitedrail.org

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