This Week at Amtrak; September 25, 2009

This Week at Amtrak; September 25, 2009

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org

Volume 6, Number 41

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Amtrak is three for three. The third report (and, there are more to come) about the start of new service is just like the two previous reports: Amtrak really doesn’t want to be in the passenger railroad business.

The third report is a feasibility report on proposed Amtrak service for the 3-C Corridor, which encompasses Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati by way of Dayton, Ohio. The two prior reports concerned the restoration of service on the Sunset Limited route east of New Orleans, and restoration of the Pioneer route from Denver northwest to Seattle.

It’s important to note that of the three reports, this report has the best detail and lays out its arguments for implementation better than the other two reports.

Let’s start with some facts and numbers as outlined in the report.

Length of route – 255 miles

Number of freight host railroads – 3

Proposed scheduled running time, end to end – 6 hours, 30 minutes

Capital costs for infrastructure improvements – $236,200,000

Capital costs for track upgrading – $51,400,000

Capital costs for mechanical facilities – $55,000,000

Capital costs for equipment procurement – $175,000,000 or $4,380,000 per piece average

Estimated annual ridership — 478,000 passengers

Estimated annual revenue – $12,200,000

Estimated annual operating expense – $29,200,000

Estimated annual operating subsidy – $17,000,000

2) Let’s start with annual revenue. Extrapolating from Amtrak’s numbers, the average fare proposed is $25.52 per passenger, or about 11 to 12 cents per revenue passenger mile.

Why Amtrak has proposed such a low number (Even though, as said in this space many times before, conservative estimates for income and high estimate for expenses are best.) is another Amtrak mystery. Amtrak’s average revenue passenger mile income for its 26 corridor routes is 20.65 cents per mile; the figure Amtrak proposes mirrors what is earned on the Kansas City-St. Louis corridor, which has an annual load factor of only 37.4%.

A bump to 14 or 15 cents a revenue passenger mile, which still puts the corridor below other routes such as the Pere Marquette, Carolinian, Wolverine, or even the Illinois Zephyr, would generate a more realistic revenue figure of $15,000,000 or more.

Look at the consist; probably 300 seats per consist of five coaches and one food service car which also has business class seating. Using the number above, Amtrak is estimating just over 1,300 passengers per day total, breaking down to 163 passengers per each of eight departures a day. While that is a robust 54% load factor, that still falls 10% or more under most other Midwest route load factors.

Amtrak has estimated operating costs of $80,000 a day for the eight departures. Train mile costs to the host railroads will run an estimated $10,000 a day, which leave another $70,000 for maintenance, crew costs (less than $11,000 a day), reservations, station costs, and corporate overhead. At these rates, Ohio could probably do better with a non-Amtrak operator than the high costs of Amtrak operations.

As with the other two reports, Amtrak says it has no equipment available in its pool of stored and wrecked equipment to get these trains on the road, and – again – trots out the line all new equipment must be purchased with years-long lead time.

Not true. Amtrak says it needs five trainsets of five coaches, one food service/business class car, one locomotive, and one non-powered control unit for push-pull operations. All of this, says Amtrak, will cost an astounding $175,000,000, or an average of $4,380,000 per car/locomotive/unit.

In its current stored/wrecked inventory, Amtrak has 55 stored Amfleet I coaches and food service cars, and 24 wrecked cars which can be restored. That’s a total of 79 pieces of equipment, for an equipment pool need of 30 passenger cars. Amtrak also has 30 P40 locomotives in storage, and nine F40 locomotives stashed away, waiting for use. Certainly, somewhere in 39 pieces of equipment, five locomotives and five NPCUs can be found without having to buy new equipment. Even at upgrading/rehab prices of $1,000,000 per car or locomotive for 40 pieces of equipment, that’s miles and miles ahead of the $175,000,000 Amtrak says it needs for all new equipment, or, a savings of $135,000,000.

The capital costs for maintenance facilities is a little steep, too. The majority of the fleet maintenance will be done in Cleveland, with turn-maintenance being performed in Cincinnati and Columbus. Fifty-five million dollars for one enclosed shop facility and one wash facility, plus a few other goodies for the turn facilities in the two other cities is high; probably by at least 40%, unless the ground these facilities are being put on is tragically expensive.

And then, there is training, which seems to be Amtrak’s favorite category to overcharge anybody who will pay the price. Estimated road crew training for this route is an astounding $5,900,000. As with the Pioneer route similar figure, it’s impossible to imagine how training road crews for a 255 mile route could even approach even half of this figure. Amtrak is doing nothing but padding its pocket at the expense of Ohio.

3) Amtrak makes a good case for the chosen route, and it’s apparent the Ohio Rail Development Commission laid down some positive guidelines for this route study. The proposed route is one of three, and it is the shortest, most direct route from Cleveland to Cincinnati via Berea, Columbus, Dayton, and Middletown.

After departure from the existing Cleveland Amtrak Lakefront station, every inch of the route is over freight tracks which do not currently host passenger trains. Some track has speed restrictions of 15 to 25 miles per hour, and goes through a lot of congested city areas.

But, the route has a nearby population of roughly 6,900,000 residents, with a large collection of colleges and universities. The cost of improving the freight infrastructure is significant, and the cost of the coming Positive Train Control must be considered in any proposal. As with the Pioneer study, most likely the early infrastructure numbers in this report represent more of a “wish list” between Amtrak, the three host railroads, and the Ohio Rail Development Commission. As with all wish lists, when reality sets in, costs usually go down, not up.

The Cleveland Lakefront station is the only current station considered for use; it’s been so long since this Ohio route area has had passenger service, no suitable stations exist for recreating this route. When you are talking about stations, you are also talking about train platforms, parking, and waiting areas. Wisely, this report and Ohio assume if a local city wants a station stop, it will pay for the construction of a station stop, as well as on-going maintenance of the station.

One bothersome aspect of the report is the proposed station in Cincinnati. Currently, Amtrak’s Cardinal stops in Cincinnati in the dead of night for three roundtrips a week. The Cardinal uses a small part of Cincinnati’s magnificent and huge art deco station. For the 3-C service, a proposal has been made another station be created out of a riverside restaurant instead of the train going a longer distance into the Cincinnati terminal complex.

The assumption is made in the report that since the Cardinal is a nocturnal train for Cincinnati, little cross business will be created. The report seems to forget passenger train riders are an intrepid lot, and when a connection can be found – no matter how inconvenient – some riders will use it.

The argument about whether or not to use the existing station and create a second station will have to be settled by those in Ohio who will eventually be writing the check for this intrastate service. However, for all of the money which will be put into infrastructure for this route, exploring the costs of extending the route – if reasonable – into the existing Cincinnati station is a worthy goal. In the end, connectivity is everything, and optimists can hope that one day more than just a nocturnal Cardinal will be calling at Cincinnati.

An interesting note in the report, talking about the Cleveland station and proposed maintenance facilities there says, “Therefore, this study recommends the construction of a shop and repair facility in Cleveland to perform all maintenance, repairs, washing, fueling and sanding, as well as layover and turnaround servicing, for the entire fleet of 3-C cars and locomotives. This should include the capability in future years to perform heavy repairs as the equipment ages. It should be noted this facility is planned, not only for the maintenance needs of the initial 3-C Corridor, but also for the future Cleveland Hub System with passenger train service proposed to be initiated rom Cleveland to Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Detroit, and other points.”

4) This report is an expensive start for Ohio, but, costs aside, it provide a rational starting point. It will be up to the Ohio Rail Development Commission to sit down with Amtrak eye to eye and go over every costly step and find out the real costs and real revenues. It’s interesting one news report said this report represents $400,000,000 more in start-up costs than Ohio had anticipated. Ohio needs to follow the leads of California and North Carolina when negotiating with Amtrak, and figure out how much is bluff and how much is fact. California learned years ago that if it left route advertising up to Amtrak, the state’s annual share of operating costs for its corridors would sky rocket. But, if California relies on its own resources, it can influence the amount of ridership, and, conversely influence the amount of subsidy needed for some trains. Ohio needs to take note.

5) Every day’s e-mail to This Week at Amtrak is a never-ending parade of thoughts and ideas. Here’s the latest.

[Begin quote]

Hello once again URPA,

I'm glad that others share my view on letting other companies operate long-distance routes in this country. Even though a lot of people in the rail community are (deservedly) excited about the aspect of high speed rail coming to their states, they should also remember that competition also applies to the long-distance trains as well, and that pressure needs to be kept on Amtrak. After reading some of the more recent TWA articles, it's obvious to me that certain people in Amtrak's management need a wake-up call (whether it's by losing out on the majority of the HSR corridors or by watching some of its long-distance routes return to the freight railroads, something big needs to happen to shake them up). After all, the poorly handled Sunset Limited report, a failure to drastically upgrade overnight fleet, and demanding states to pay for long-distance routes have all happened on their watch.

Division B, Title II, Section 214 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 says:

(a) In General – Within 1 year after the date of enactment of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, the Federal Railroad Administration shall complete a rulemaking proceeding to develop a pilot program that –

`(1) permits a rail carrier or rail carriers that own infrastructure over which Amtrak operates a passenger rail service route described in subparagraph (B), (C), or (D) of section 24102(5) or in section 24702 to petition the Administration to be considered as a passenger rail service provider over that route in lieu of Amtrak for a period not to exceed 5 years after the date of enactment of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008.

Now, with all the talk about whether Amtrak is really disinterested in operating long-distance trains in the long-term, why don't some of the friendlier host railroads contemplate bidding for some of the overnight routes? Pullman may be gone, but the hosts could talk to a manufacturer like the revived Colorado Rail Car company about acquiring some real dining cars and sleepers.

At last year's Railway Age conference, railroad author Frank Wilner advocated returning intercity passenger trains to the freight companies because he thought that “a sound business model” would win over anti-Amtrak politicians in Congress (Source: January 2009 Railfan & Railroads). While it sounds tempting, I’m not sure that all passenger routes can be returned to the host railroads. Instead, I propose that the hosts talk to the likes of Herzog, First Group America, and some of the foreign bidders for HSR and get them to run the trains. I would definitely like to see routes like the Crescent and Silver Star be supplemented with daytime counterparts so I don't have to go from the Carolinas to Atlanta or Florida in the middle of the night.

The hosts would work out a three or four-way partnership with each other and the new entity operating the route (for example, a daily Sunset Limited could have an agreement with BNSF, CSX, Union Pacific, and First Group America) as a way of avoiding the problem of changing trains. Meanwhile, BNSF could run the Southwest Chief by itself and add routes and branches like a spur to Phoenix (a similar situation would apply to Norfolk Southern with the Crescent).

One more thing, the Auto Train concept could be added to other markets by the host railroads (after all, those empty auto racks currently seen on freight trains could be very useful). It may not have been feasible to have a Midwest-Florida Auto Train route 26 years ago, but if gas ever returns to September 2008 levels, it would be more than practical for the Auto Train concept to be extended to other parts of the country.

– Anonymous

P.S. Based on the discussion in the URPA Intranet group during the Labor Day weekend, states like Florida should contact Veolia or any of the companies which fail to get HSR bids to operate conventional speed routes as a precursor to high speed service.

[End quote]

6) Coming in the next issue of TWA: William Lindley of Scottsdale, Arizona has more thoughts on the future of passenger rail.

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J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

brucerichardson@unitedrail.org

http://www.unitedrail.org

This Week at Amtrak; September 22, 2009

This Week at Amtrak; September 22, 2009

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org

Volume 6, Number 40

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Now, there is no doubt. Amtrak doesn’t want to be in the passenger railroad business. Last week Amtrak released a requested study on Ohio’s “3 C” corridor, which runs from Cleveland to Cincinnati via Columbus and Dayton. And, Amtrak released a preliminary draft for discussion for the much-awaited Pioneer route restoration between (Chicago), Denver, and the Pacific Northwest. The part of the route from Chicago to Denver would travel over the existing California Zephyr route, but from Denver westward it would be a restored route.

We will examine each proposal, with the Ohio examination coming in the next issue of This Week at Amtrak, but it’s clear Amtrak is pricing the costs of these routes so high it’s trying to discourage backers and political entities along the route it really doesn’t want to create or restore either of these routes, much in the vein it did with the previous Gulf Coast report earlier this summer.

Yes, of course, any good businessman makes a presentation which is conservative on sales projections, and high on costs. That way, when things work out like they are supposed to beyond the projections, there are no nasty little surprises. But, Amtrak has gone to such extremes in both of these instances, one can only begin to guess at the metrics Amtrak used to create these studies. Good business sense certainly never came into play when putting these studies together.

One consistent component of these two studies and the previous Gulf Coast study is Amtrak expects individual states to pony up money for these trains, and doesn’t seem to assume any responsibility for being a national passenger train operator, which transcends state boundaries.

2) To read the Pioneer preliminary report asking for comment before final submission to Congress on October 15^th is to truly understand corporate shallowness.

For years, Amtrak has gotten away with running the Empire Builder with a Portland, Oregon section separate from the Seattle section by splitting and joining the train in Spokane, Washington. Just as Amtrak does also with the Boston section of the Lake Shore Limited separate from the New York City section, nearly a complete train is operated, minus a dining car. Both of these operations miss a huge revenue producing opportunity for a full, second frequency to operate over the majority of the route.

Time and again, we know a second frequency on any route not only boosts ridership, revenues, and revenue passenger miles significantly, but it also spreads the infrastructure costs such as stations over two trains instead of one.

The Silver Meteor and Silver Star on the Right Coast travel nearly identical routes between New York City and Miami, with the Star diverting from the Meteor’s route to traverse the old Seaboard Air Line Railroad route via Raleigh, North Carolina and Columbia, South Carolina, and also call at Tampa, Florida. Less than four hours is added to the running time of the Star versus the Meteor, and the payback for that is reflected in two million additional revenue passenger miles generated for the Star over the Meteor’s performance.

The Silver Meteor generated in Fiscal Year 2008 $30,538,800 in revenue, 194,454,000 revenue passenger miles, and carried 319,800 souls an average length of trip of 608 miles. The Silver Star generated $28,111,900 in revenue, 196,924,000 revenue passenger miles, and carried 367,100 passengers an average length of trip of 536 miles.

The Empire Builder generated $59,389,600 in revenue, 409,480,000 revenue passenger miles, and carried 554,300 passengers an average length of trip of 739 miles. The Lake Shore Limited generated $24,212,000 in revenue, 152,329,000 revenue passenger miles, and carried 345,600 passengers an average length of trip of 441 miles.

You can easily see the strength of both the Silver Meteor and Silver Star, and it’s also easy to imagine if the Portland section of the Empire Builder became the Western Star as its own, second frequency all the way to Chicago how much fiscal strength and transportation output it would generate, as would a second frequency of the Lake Shore Limited into Boston serving the same purpose.

So, Amtrak’s plan for the possibility of a restored Pioneer to is add three cars to the California Zephyr between Chicago and Denver, consisting of a coach, coach/baggage, and sleeper. In Denver, a dedicated diner/lounge and separate locomotive would be added to the minuscule consist and form the Pioneer to the Pacific Northwest, terminating in either Portland or Seattle (Seattle being the better option of the two.).

Amtrak projected ridership and revenue for the Pioneer is too small, too. As said above, while being conservative in projections is the best method, Amtrak projections tend more to fatalism than objectivity.

Amtrak has produced four options for restored Pioneer service, Option 1 being a Salt Lake City-Seattle choice, with 102,000 passengers and $11.6 million in revenue projected.

Option 2 is a Denver-Seattle choice, with 111,000 passengers and $13.1 million in revenue projected.

Option 3 is a Salt Lake City-Portland choice, with 82,000 passengers and $7.6 million in revenue, and Option 4 is a Denver-Portland option with 95,000 passengers and $9.2 million in revenue projected.

Option 2 is consistently the best choice, even though through Amtrak’s projections it also has the greatest cost. Option 2 restores service over Union Pacific’s fabled Overland Route through Wyoming, which would bring service to another state currently without passenger rail benefits.

Much of Amtrak’s projections are based on ridership and revenues from the former Pioneer, which ceased operations in 1997. In FY 1992, Pioneer ridership peaked at 156,000 passengers a year. Amtrak states in its preliminary report it expects lower ridership because of stiffer airline competition in the region. Amtrak likes to sell itself short with silly statements like this; it never seems to understand the uniqueness of its own product and the desirability of its product among all classes of travelers.

Amtrak is projecting per mile passenger revenue of 12.2 cents, which would place it only above the Sunset Limited, with revenue of 12.1 cents per passenger mile. It’s a mystery why Amtrak would use this number, since the California Zephyr generates 14.5 cents per passenger mile, the Southwest Chief 13.3 cents per passenger mile, and the Empire Builder 14.5 cents. Why there is any presumption of such a low passenger mile figure can only be explained that Amtrak doesn’t want this train to come back.

The 111,000 figure for ridership is easily low by 25,000 passengers, but, if a second frequency all the way from Chicago to Denver and then a single frequency to Seattle was used because it is a better choice, then a ridership figure of 250,000 to 300,000 is more likely. Yes, this would require more equipment, but, that’s the cost of having the burden of meeting consumer demand.

When you couple realistic passenger mile revenue of 14.5 cents per passenger mile as is found on the California Zephyr with the ridership of a second frequency, suddenly the Pioneer is not only a good idea, but a great idea. Perhaps Amtrak doesn’t want to do this because it is afraid of a new service being successful? After all, it’s very difficult for Amtrak today to hide the outright success of its long distance trains, so adding another train would just add to Amtrak’s problems of explaining why long distance trains always work better than state supported corridor trains with greater transportation output and greater efficiencies in every area.

Training and personnel preparation is another area where Amtrak’s proposal seems to be from outer space. Amtrak wants to budget $6.6 million for crew training for Option 2. Why? Perhaps, Amtrak is considering taking kindergarten students and paying for their entire education (including advanced university graduate studies degrees) and, a lifetime later, making them train and engine crew members. The Pioneer is proposed to operate over a route that is already a freight railroad route; there is no blazing of trails going on here. Between Portland and Seattle, the route is an existing Amtrak route, so it’s just a matter of adding more crew to the crew base, not creating an whole new cadre of employees. As far as the portion of the route between Denver and Portland, it is not rocket science to recruit and train railroad employees. Amtrak has obviously based its numbers of taking raw employees off the street and turning them into railroaders, and then doubling that cost for a final project figure. In the real world, that is not only unrealistic, but just silly.

On the subject of equipment, Amtrak says it doesn’t have enough equipment on the wreck line it could fix, or other cars in storage to get this service moving. It wants (like in the Gulf Coast report) up to four years to develop and build new equipment, at a cost of $123 million for an expected need (for the too short consist) of 27 cars and locomotives, total. That breaks down to over $4,500,000 for each piece of equipment. Perhaps they are projecting all of this equipment will be made of gold and platinum? This figure is way too high, plus, a few pieces of equipment could come from Amtrak’s wreck line at a much lower price for rehabilitation instead of new build. Amtrak says it needs to buy four new locomotives in this equipment group, but it has seven wrecked P42s in its inactive fleet, plus 30 stored P40s, and nine stored F40s. There are other bits and pieces of Superliner equipment Amtrak has that could easily supplement this equipment request without having to buy everything new.

The report goes on and on in this vain vein. Probably, the numbers Union Pacific Railroad have submitted for track upgrades are a good starting point for a wish list, and it would help all parties concerned for some infrastructure improvement on the line.

As far as station costs are concerned, Amtrak worries greatly about taking some existing buildings and having to upgrade them for Americans With Disabilities Act compliance. While this has great merit, it always seems to be Amtrak’s default position on any new project; it doesn’t have the money to spend for ADA compliance. After over a decade without service, many of the route stations have either been removed or converted to other purposes. There will be a great need for new station facilities. However, this is a reasonable expense for cities and towns that wish to have passenger rail service to share the expenses. If they want passenger rail service, provide the portal for that, just like for airlines.

Amtrak says it will need $469,800,000 to restart Pioneer service, with Denver as the jumping off point. The majority of that is $324,100,000 for track and signals, including the coming need for Positive Train Control.

An educated guess says this cost is $150,000,000 too high, including unrealistic training, equipment, and new station costs. By the time a realistic number is agreed upon between Amtrak and the Union Pacific Railroad, that $469 million should be closer to $320,000,000.

Ridership, revenue, and revenue passenger mile projections are tremendously under-represented, and operating expenses are tremendously over-represented. When the true figures meet in the middle, farebox recovery should be in the 50% or higher range (As opposed to Amtrak’s guess of 28%).

So, at this point, if you’re an elected official of any of the states hoping for a restored Pioneer, what do you do? Amtrak wants $469 million in start-up costs, and then it expects ongoing subsidies to run a train that is positioned in the most expensive way it can be to drain government treasuries.

Here’s an idea. Let Amtrak submit its grossly flawed report, with all of the figures as gospel. Then, spend some more money and some more time (After all, Amtrak wants four years or more to restore this service, so to them time is not a factor.), and find a credible passenger rail consulting firm to create a real route analysis, using real world numbers, and then take that report and beat Amtrak over the head with it until it comes to its senses and becomes realistic on what it will take to restore the Pioneer as part of its long distance system.

3) Here is the most compelling part of the Amtrak Pioneer report.

[Begin quote]

These projections reflect the fact that all or virtually all of the equipment required for Pioneer restoration would have to be purchased new. Despite growing ridership, Amtrak’s long distance equipment fleet is smaller now than it was when the Pioneer operated. Due to funding constraints, Amtrak has not ordered any new long distance equipment since the early 1990s, and most of the “Heritage” cars built for other railroads that Amtrak acquired at its formation have been retired due to age. Amtrak’s existing fleet of bi-level Superliner cars is insufficient to meet equipment requirements on the nine long distance trains that currently use Superliner equipment, and Amtrak has only a small number of repairable “wreck status” Superliner cars. In addition, if Amtrak is to continue to provide existing services on long distance routes, it must in the very near future replace nearly 100 remaining “Heritage” cars that are now more than half a century old.

Amtrak has recently issued a request for proposals for the acquisition of 130 single-level long distance cars, primarily to replace the remaining Heritage cars (although funding for this purchase has not yet been identified). Purchasing additional single-level cars to equip a restored Pioneer would not be an optimal solution. Single level cars would accommodate fewer passengers, and operation of single-level Pioneer cars to/from Chicago on the bi-level California Zephyr would trigger a need for additional Superliner “transition” cars (which are in particularly short supply) equipped with a high-level door one end and a single-level door on the other.

A purchase of new bi-level equipment for the Pioneer, which would take approximately four years for design, procurement and construction, would have to be part of a larger equipment order. The high upfront design and tooling costs associated with building passenger rail cars make it uneconomic to construct them in small quantities. Amtrak is preparing a comprehensive equipment fleet strategy that will, among other things, address the existing shortage of bi-level Superliner cars that limits capacity on Western long distance trains. An order for new bi-level equipment, which would be subject to funding availability, could provide the means to acquire additional equipment for new services such as a restored Pioneer.

[End quote]

What is Amtrak saying, here? Has Amtrak actually said – in writing, in an official document, no less – it has demand for long distance trains that is not being met? (Gasp!) Could this be true? Amtrak has unmet demand on trains which are not corridor trains? Could this be a whole line of revenue Amtrak is ignoring? What about taking more cars out of the wreck line and storage yard and putting them into service? Would that imperil Amtrak’s ongoing business plan which is to mainly request government subsidies instead of generating revenue inhouse?

And, take a look at the line, “Amtrak is preparing a comprehensive equipment fleet strategy that will, among other things, address the existing shortage of bi-level Superliner cars that limits capacity on Western long distance trains. An order for new bi-level equipment, which would be subject to funding availability, could provide the means to acquire additional equipment for new services as a restored Pioneer.”

(Gasp! again) NEW SERVICES? Our Amtrak? Is someone actually preparing a vision for the future for Amtrak? Inquiring minds want to know.

3) While you’re trying to wrap your mind around that concept just above, here’s an editorial which is appearing in the October 2009 issue of RAILPACE Newsmagazine, which is appearing on news stands today. This commentary is by Tom Nemeth, Editor-in-Chief of RAILPACE, and is used with his permission.

[Begin quote]

EDITORIAL

By Tom Nemeth

Amtrak: Getting the Lead Out

Now that Amtrak has adequate funding for operations and growth, while enjoying unprecedented public and political support, it is time for a management makeover. Amtrak service today, with a few exceptions on some western long-hauls and the Acelas, is beginning to look like the final days of Penn Central. While top management obsesses about photographers, on-time performance continues to lag, trains are dirty, shopworn, and overcrowded. What is the meaning of a “reserved train” when passengers are required to stand between Wilmington and Washington, as a friend did on Train 94 on a recent Friday. This editor endured a Business Class coach from Trenton to Newport News on Train 99 on March 28 with reeking toilets. A round trip on the Texas Eagle on June 15 and June 23 last year, in addition to being 8 hours late each way, revealed shopworn Superliners badly in need of a facelift. Another colleague, writing Amtrak in protest of a rather rude trainman, was advised that Amtrak management is not responsible for the behavior of its crews. Granted that working a crowded train is not easy, but there must be recognition that the company (and Federal funding) exists for the benefit of Amtrak’s customers, the riding public. In short, it appears that top management just doesn’t care.

There are other Amtrak customers too. The commuter railroads whose spine is the Northeast Corridor, are not treated any better by Amtrak’s insular management.The faulty design of the ARC rail tunnel now being built under the Hudson River, which will not connect to Penn Station in Manhattan, is partly the fault of Amtrak, which did not want a seat at the table when the project was in initial design, a fatal flaw that will haunt regional rail advocates for generations. Amtrak management just didn’t care about “NJ Transit’s tunnel.” New York’s MTA continues to struggle with Amtrak’s inability to execute its responsibility for the Long Island Rail Road East Side Access project. This represents a lack of accountability by Amtrak management, who are in a unique position to influence the outcome of these multi-billion dollar investments. Amtrak’s own engineering department continues to lack competent leadership, allowing substandard quality concrete ties onto the Northeast Corridor (now being replaced at great expense), and serious structural cracks in a bridge in Elizabeth, NJ, to go unnoticed by inadequately trained maintenance workers.

But where IS management? Corporate culture on Norfolk Southern and other successful railroads dictates that Division Superintendents and Engineering Department officers are not to be found sitting in their offices; rather they get out and ride the trains regularly and observe the property firsthand. On Amtrak, they sequester themselves behind desks and await their long-sought retirement day.

Then there’s the issue of Amtrak operations. Shrinking consists in an era of growing ridership hardly makes sense. Amtrak’s “One Size Fits All” policy for its long-distance trainsets is also bizarre. One would expect that Western train consists would swell in the summer months, while Florida bound consists would lengthen significantly in the winter season.

Amtrak’s culture is one of meetings and seminars, and hiring consultants to produce “studies” for a laissez-faire management that doesn’t want to work to resolve the issues themselves.

Meanwhile, Amtrak’s lethargic bureaucracy continues to balloon. The agency continues to be a dumping ground for failed bureaucrats and retirees from other government agencies eagerly awaiting retirement. In fact, many already seem to be there.

This is not a Democratic or Republican partisan issue, rather, it concerns the willingness of elected officials to finally purge Amtrak’s management ranks of Bush-era minions and install new, energetic top leaders who are committed to growth and expansion; whose actions speak louder than words (and their consultants’ reports.)

Nearly a year after the U.S. election, Amtrak still does not have a corporate Strategic Plan for growth. As of this writing, management still does not have a Fleet Plan in place, nor new equipment on order. Management has become so moribund that Joe Szabo, the recently-appointed Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration, recently had to direct Amtrak Acting President Joe Boardman to come up with a Fleet Plan. Hello.

Amtrak’s Bush-era management team has become more insular and combative, and dismissive of its long term supporters and customers; witness Amtrak’s illegal Photography Ban, perhaps the Boardman Administration’s only “accomplishment” this year. Boardman, a career bureaucrat, disdains individual discussions with media editors and freelance photojournalists concerning Amtrak’s strategic plans and initiatives, and has refused to acknowledge communications from citizens and customers regarding Amtrak’s Photo Ban.

Change must start from the top, and there are a number of great rail executives who stand ready to lead Amtrak out of its chaos this fall, when Acting President Joseph Boardman’s term is finished. These luminaries include Gene Skoropowski, managing director for California’s Capitol Corridor Joint Powers Authority, the agency responsible for intercity passenger rail service linking Sacramento with the Bay Area. Skoropowski has spearheaded growth and development of intercity and corridor passenger rail in California, including implementation of CalTrain’s “Baby Bullet” trains. Peter Cannito, former Executive Vice President of Engineering at Amtrak, and retired president of Metro North Railroad, brings a wealth of engineering expertise. Dennis F. Sullivan, former Amtrak Executive Vice President, is a seasoned Operations railroader who will bring customer focus to Amtrak. These three individuals form the backbone of a team that will inspire performance among Amtrak employees and get the company moving forward.

While politics is a necessary aspect of Amtrak’s presidency, it cannot be the only aspect. It is essential now to rebuild Amtrak’s management team, to run the company as a railroad and as a business, to achieve a vibrant and growing national system.

The U.S. had an extensive passenger rail system until the 1960s, when financial losses caused for-profit railroads to jettison their passenger services. Now that Federal and State governments have begun to accept responsibility for funding a national passenger rail system, there is growing support for breaking the 38-year old Amtrak monopoly on intercity passenger service, and allowing freight railroads and/or private operators to take over Amtrak routes, or even launch new services. This may be the Amtrak Board’s last chance to install competent, growth– and customer– oriented management, or the current groundswell of public and political support for passenger rail— and Amtrak’s monopoly of it— may soon come to an end.

[End quote]

Okay, Amtrak, more and more people in the non-Amworld are wondering what you’re up to; the “business as usual” status quo is no longer acceptable. Do something. The days of laying around and whining about the world being so terribly unfair are over. You’re expected to perform, just like everyone else.

If you are reading someone else’s copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each edition by sending your e-mail address to

freetwa@unitedrail.org

You MUST include your name, preferred e-mail address, and city and state where you live. If you have filters or firewalls placed on your Internet connection, set your e-mail to receive incoming mail from twa@unitedrail.org; we are unable to go through any approvals processes for individuals. This mailing list is kept strictly confidential and is not shared or used for any purposes other than distribution of This Week at Amtrak or related URPA materials.

All other correspondence, including requests to unsubscribe should be addressed to

brucerichardson@unitedrail.org

Copies of This Week at Amtrak are archived on URPA’s web site, www.unitedrail.org and also on www.todaywithjb.blogspot.com where other rail-related writings of Bruce Richardson may also be found.

URPA leadership members are available for speaking engagements.

J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

brucerichardson@unitedrail.org

http://www.unitedrail.org

This Week at Amtrak; September 18, 2009

This Week at Amtrak; September 18, 2009

A weekly digest of events, opinions, and forecasts from

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

America’s foremost passenger rail policy institute

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203 • Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739, Electronic Mail info@unitedrail.org • http://www.unitedrail.org

Volume 6, Number 39

Founded over three decades ago in 1976, URPA is a nationally known policy institute which focuses on solutions and plans for passenger rail systems in North America. Headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, URPA has professional associates in Minnesota, California, Arizona, New Mexico, the District of Columbia, Texas, New York, and other cities. For more detailed information, along with a variety of position papers and other documents, visit the URPA web site at http://www.unitedrail.org.

URPA is not a membership organization, and does not accept funding from any outside sources.

1) Word has come from Gil Carmichael, former Federal Railroad Administration Administrator and Chairman of the Amtrak Reform Council.

[Begin quote]

PRESS RELEASE

For Immediate Release

ITI's Gil Carmichael Calls for holistic transportation policy

- Says Two, New Intermodal Trust Funds Should Subsidize "Ethical" Intermodal Transportation System -

DENVER, CO, September 18, 2009 – In recent comments to the 68th Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (SASHTO), held in Biloxi, Mississippi, Gil Carmichael, Founding Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Intermodal Transportation Institute (ITI) at the University of Denver, said the key to solving the nation's 21st century transportation problems lies in establishing a holistic approach funded by two, new intermodal trust funds – one for freight movement, the other for passenger transit, and both based on miles traveled.

Speaking to a technical session of 1,200 government and association members from 12 states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, addressing today's transportation challenges, Carmichael said the nation needs to establish an ethical and sustainable "intermodal" transportation system that incorporates both freight and passenger rail in order to produce a new transportation structure that meets 21st century needs. This system should be a joint public- and private-sector initiative that builds and expands upon the success of the Interstate Highway System of the last century.

"The Interstate Highway System that was built has served us well," he said. "But today we have a population that has doubled in 50 years; we have a deteriorating and badly congested transportation infrastructure that cannot meet consumer demand; and we have a growing global economy that requires interconnected, intermodal transportation. The solution to meeting this century's challenges lies in building 'Interstate 2.0', an ethical, fuel efficient, intercity, rail freight and passenger transportation system that reconnects our center cities, bus and transit lines, energizes our economy, and sustains our environment. It is a logical and necessary next step forward."

Among the challenges addressed by the two-day conference was the major dilemma of how a new transportation policy and such a massive intermodal transportation system would be paid for – especially with the end of the highway trust fund and declining gas tax revenues in sight. Carmichael offered several paradigms to address this concern:

• Develop a Holistic Transportation Policy. "Historically, this nation has had a 'single mode' mindset." he said. "Our federal government and state DOTs have not addressed transportation as an interconnected, intermodal system, choosing instead to address each mode independently. That myopic approach will no longer work in our global business environment. Today, the public and private sectors need to partner and address our transportation requirements as they relate to two intermodal modes – freight and passenger rail. This involves utilizing our 240,000 miles of existing (and paid for) rail Rights of Way (ROW) and upgrading about 30,000 miles of it to high-speed, grade-separated track. We should provide the private railroads with a 25 percent investment tax credit to encourage them to upgrade and double- and triple-track their main lines to increase speeds and double capacity. A high-speed rail network that reconnects our center cities, major airports, and ports is vital to 21st century transportation and economic development."

• Create Two Intermodal Trust Funds. "One of the dilemmas we are faced with is: how do we pay for this intermodal system?" he asked. "We paid for the Interstate Highway System with a highway trust fund from gas tax usage. The gas tax worked well for the highway and it is about to expire. To replace it, I strongly recommend the U.S. put into place two, new intermodal trust funds to pay for this new multimodal transportation system. There would be one tax for intermodal freight movement and another for passenger transit. And it would be simple to implement cost per mile traveled rather than cents per gallon."

• Reorganize State DOTs to Oversee Intermodal Transportation. "With a new intermodal transportation system in place, we should reorganize our state DOTs so we have two separate departments that are responsible for intermodal freight transport and passenger transit, respectively," he explained. "We can no longer afford to administer effective transportation policy on a single mode basis. States would also build or lease high-speed track on the private railroads' ROWs to allow new, modern, intermodal freight and passenger trains."

• Utilize Our New Technologies. "We have the technology, such as GPS and PTC, to make this intermodal transportation system work, and technology continues to advance," said Carmichael. "High-speed tracks could be grade separated just like the Interstate Highways so we can safely run passenger trains at 110-125 MPH and freight trains at up to 90 MPH, vastly increasing freight capacity. This could cut highway fatalities by at least 50 percent and drastically reduce the stress, wear and tear, and cost of maintaining the highways, thus extending its life.”

• Increase Freight Capacity and Stimulate the Economy. "A major public-works project of this magnitude will add millions of new and permanent jobs, will produce a prosperous economy, just as Interstate I did, and will build a long-lasting, truly sustainable transportation system," said Carmichael. "We can electrify the rails by mid-century, producing a new source of energy and weaning ourselves off of our dependence on foreign fossil fuels. It will then be an ethical and sustainable system that increases freight capacity and protects our environment."

In closing, Carmichael said: "A new holistic, ethical transportation policy will build upon the strengths of each mode, will reduce injuries and deaths, will be environmentally benign, will not waste fuel, will not cost too much to use, and will provide ongoing economic stability. This 21st century intermodal transportation infrastructure will use the ‘steel wheel and steel rail’ – the same as it did in the 19th century – as its fundamental element of transport."

About ITI

The Intermodal Transportation Institute at the University of Denver offers an Executive Masters Program that awards a Master of Science in Intermodal Transportation Management from the University of Denver. This graduate degree program prepares transportation industry managers for the increasingly complex, global business environment where knowledge of finance, quantitative processes, supply chain, law, and public policy issues as well as freight, passenger, and intermodal transportation operational strategies are critical management tools for success. For more information on the ITI Executive Masters Program call: 303-871-4702 or visit: www.du.edu/transportation.

[End quote]

Whatever plan moves us into the future – and Mr. Carmichael usually has the sharpest eye on the future – is going to have to find new ways to pay for the next generation of railroads and highways. The original highway trust fund at one time was sacrosanct, and left alone. Too many uninspired members of Congress kept looking at the pool of money and thinking about how many local pork barrel projects in their districts could be funded with someone else’s money, and ever since then, the highway trust fund lost its integrity. If Congress has the will to plan correctly for the future, it will have the necessary nerves of steel to set up new funding mechanisms which again become sacrosanct and are dedicated to the very important cause of surface transportation. It’s time for Congress to adopt the stepchild and call it its own.

2) The gun haters are going nuts. This week, the Senate passed a bill requiring Amtrak to restore the rights of gun owners to transport guns on Amtrak under proper safety precautions in baggage cars.

To read some of the hilarious, delirious ravings of the gun haters, you would think the Senate is inviting known terrorists to a tea party and asking them to bring along their weapons of choice.

Amtrak used to allow guns onboard trains in baggage cars, prior to September 11, 2001. Since then, Amtrak – acting on its own after 9/11 and the later Madrid train bombings – banned guns from its trains.

However, the Senate, in an overwhelming majority vote, has told Amtrak either figure out a way to get the guns safely and securely back on trains, or your free federal monies go away, as soon as March of 2010.

The gun haters, with great whining and gnashing of teeth, have said it’s impossible to make this happen.

More rational people have reminded one and all we have this controlling document in our lives as Americans – it’s know as the Constitution for those who may have forgotten about it with everything going on in Washington these days – which plainly and loudly says Americans have the right to own and carry guns.

These same rational people also like to point out the TSA (Those same passenger-friendly people who love to watch us take off our shoes in airports.) already has lots of plans in place for things like guns on Amtrak.

The sooner they return, the better.

3) Union Pacific Railroad, the railroad everyone thinks loves to hate passenger trains, apparently is willing to make some money embracing one particular passenger train.

The Chicago Tribune reported today, in a story datelined Denver, the Ski Train may be back this winter, operating between Denver and the Winter Park resort. Previously operating for 69 years, the Ski Train was thought to be dead when its previous owner ended the operation and sold his passenger rail equipment to a Canadian scenic passenger operator.

In came Iowa Pacific Holdings, with former Amtraker Ed Ellis now as President of Iowa Pacific, and the Ski Train is back on schedule. Iowa Pacific operates other short passenger routes, mostly as scenic and entertainment trains.

Mr. Ellis said Iowa Pacific would use Iowa Pacific equipment and contract with Amtrak to provide train and engine crews. A deal has not been finalized with Amtrak.

Okay, let’s take a roll call.

Union Pacific, which, through its official spokesman once described Amtrak as “novelty transportation,” is striking a deal with an operator to allow a seasonal, regularly scheduled passenger train operate over its tracks, which it could have easily let go away after the original operator pulled out.

Then, Amtrak, which sometimes thinks of itself as “novelty transportation” instead of being an important part of our domestic surface transportation network, is in the process of cutting a deal with someone else to run passenger trains.

Gosh (gasp!), could capitalism in passenger rail be rearing its allegedly ugly head and someone has figured out how a passenger rail operation can make money for all parties concerned?

What’s wrong with these people? Aren’t they listening to all of the alleged experts that continuously drone on and on and on that only government is capable of running any sort of passenger train in the proper manner (Which means at a loss.)?

4) Lots of mail came into the This Week at Amtrak e-mailbox after the last issue of TWA calling for another operator to replace Amtrak.

Here’s a sample.

[Begin quote]

As the British would say: "Here, Here" to your latest newsletter! What about a new corporation formed by a consortium of freight railroads to run a national passenger railroad system? Since there is little more consolidation to be done between the big boys, perhaps the congress and courts would approve such a novel arrangement as there would be no freight competition issues. The freight lines would benefit from aid in infrastructure construction, and having open knowledge of all passenger operations, the freight lines would certainly be more flexible in schedule development/alternate routes even over competing lines since the passenger business would benefit all of them. Now, that "by George" would be a nice trick to pull off, especially since it might even make sense!

[End quote]

[Begin quote]

The message both Joe & Joe (Boardman and Biden) should hear is: If you can't do it right, don't do it at all. Give it up!

I like the idea of shutting-down Amtrak, but suggest a slight variation.

Keep Amtrak in operation. However, quarantine Amtrak between Washington, DC; Boston, Springfield, Massachusetts; Albany, New York; and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Transition the remainder of the inter-city passenger rail network, and the franchise rights for additional rail services, to one or more other entities.

If Amtrak believes their NEC is so profitable and is the only part of their network deserving investment, as demonstrated by their actions, and trains in the remainder of the country are bleeding amounts of red-ink exceeding the combined inventory of all retail stationery stores, give Amtrak what it wants!

Let's see how long Amtrak can survive with the NEC and a reduced or zero subsidy.

[End quote]

5) And, finally, this advertisement for a vacant position for a qualified person at Amtrak came floating in to TWA.

[Begin quote]

Inspector General - Eff. 09/04/09 Choose actions for Inspector General - Eff. 09/04/09 Apply Remember

Location: District of Columbia-Washington

Req. Number: 90000243

Description: THE SAFETY OF OUR PASSENGERS, OUR EMPLOYEES, THE PUBLIC AND OUR OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IS OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY!

Position Title: Inspector General

Department: Office of Inspector General

Location: Washington, DC

Posting #: 90000243

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL APPLICANTS

SUMMARY OF DUTIES: Amtrak's IG reports to the Chairman of Amtrak's Board of Directors and the Congress. The IG will keep them currently informed, by means of periodic reports required by the IG Act, concerning fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations administered or financed by Amtrak, to recommend corrective action concerning such problems, abuses, and deficiencies, and to report on the progress made in implementing such corrective action. Amtrak's Inspector General will:

-Serve as the conscience of Amtrak.

-Work with Amtraks Board of Directors and the Congress to improve program management.

-Maximize the positive impact and ensure the independence and objectivity of Amtrak OIGs audits, investigations and other reviews.

-Use Amtrak OIGs investigations and other reviews to increase integrity and recommend improved systems to prevent fraud, waste and abuse.

-Be innovative, question existing procedures, and suggest improvements to programs.

-Where appropriate, build relationships with program managers based on a shared commitment to improving program operations and effectiveness.

-Work with Amtrak to address company-wide issues, both independently and collectively.

EDUCATION: An undergraduate degree is required.

PERFERRED EDUCATION: An advanced or Masters degree in an applicable field is preferred.

WORK EXPERIENCE: The Inspector General should have the following:

-Be an independent-minded leader who possesses the integrity to ensure Amtrak’s full compliance with the IG Act.

-Either be a sitting Inspector General or Deputy Inspector General, or have recent similar experience.

-A minimum of 10 years cumulative progressively responsible administrative, managerial and supervisory experience that provides extensive knowledge of auditing and inspection practices, law enforcement policies and procedures, accounting, internal controls, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, and/or investigation techniques.

-A comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the audit, investigation and evaluation standards issued by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency and the Government Accountability Office.

-Direct experience working with upper management, the media and Congress.

-Significant experience in management and a thorough understanding of Federal and IG audits, investigations, law enforcement and evaluations involving large scale companies and operations.

-Evidences familiarity with the Comptroller General's auditing standards.

-Ideally, have an understanding of railroad operations.

-Strong analytical skills and judgment to support critical decision making.

-Unquestioned ethical standards, high level of integrity, sound professional judgment, strong leadership skills, an understanding of business acumen, a high level of common sense and the ability to think logically.

-The ability to work under pressure and make sound decisions with limited information.

-Significant experience with leadership, human capital, and managing budgets.

-The ability to build a strong team; the IG should not be intimidated by a talented staff.

-Strong coalition-building and interpersonal skills to form solid relationships both internally and externally; s/he can work through internal conflicts and/or disagreements successfully.

-Excellent written and oral communication skills, including a strong ability to present to audiences both large and small.

-High energy and committed work ethic.

-No personal or professional relationships with Amtrak that would hinder the candidate's ability to be objective and independent with respect to audits and investigations of Amtrak and its operations.

OTHER REQUIREMENTS: The Amtrak Inspector General will have the responsibility of assuring best practices in the Amtrak OIG. The Inspector General will supervise over 90 OIG employees in conducting independent, objective audits, evaluations and investigations relating to Amtrak programs and operations.

This individual must demonstrate credibility, integrity and objectivity, be a strong communicator internally and externally, and have extensive relevant experience.

The successful candidate will have a strong commitment to the Amtrak mission. The candidates commitment should reflect an interest to help build the Amtrak enterprise, creating best practices for a "first class" organization for the passengers, employees and stakeholders. The successful candidate must also demonstrate an equally strong commitment to implementing all requirements of the IG Act.

SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES: 99 employees and 8 ARRA employees

TRAVEL: Less than 25%

AMTRAK EMPLOYEES MUST COMPLETE A JOB OPPORTUNITY APPLICATION TO APPLY FOR THIS POSITION.

Hiring Range: $246,000.00 - $268,000.00

Annually

Last Date to Apply: 09/30/09

Position Type: Permanent

Job Category: Inspector General

Years of Experience: 10 - 15

Travel Requirements: <25%

Relocation Benefits May Apply: Yes

Classification Agreement: No

Referral Bonus: 2500 pts

[End quote]

Well, Amtrak ASKED for all of the right things. It’s another story as to whether or not the new IG will be able to accomplish anything without the type of interference which seems to have occurred in the immediate past.

If you are reading someone else’s copy of This Week at Amtrak, you can receive your own free copy each edition by sending your e-mail address to

freetwa@unitedrail.org

You MUST include your name, preferred e-mail address, and city and state where you live. If you have filters or firewalls placed on your Internet connection, set your e-mail to receive incoming mail from twa@unitedrail.org; we are unable to go through any approvals processes for individuals. This mailing list is kept strictly confidential and is not shared or used for any purposes other than distribution of This Week at Amtrak or related URPA materials.

All other correspondence, including requests to unsubscribe should be addressed to

brucerichardson@unitedrail.org

Copies of This Week at Amtrak are archived on URPA’s web site, www.unitedrail.org and also on www.todaywithjb.blogspot.com where other rail-related writings of Bruce Richardson may also be found.

URPA leadership members are available for speaking engagements.

J. Bruce Richardson

President

United Rail Passenger Alliance, Inc.

1526 University Boulevard, West, PMB 203

Jacksonville, Florida 32217-2006 USA

Telephone 904-636-7739

brucerichardson@unitedrail.org

http://www.unitedrail.org